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learning is asymmetric between incumbent and outside firms. I develop an asymmet-
ric employer learning model in which endogenous job mobility is both a direct result
of intensified adverse selection and a signal used by outside employers to update their
expectations about workers’ productive ability. I derive, from the model, empirical
implications regarding the relationship between wage rates, ability, schooling and
overall measures of job separations that contrasts the public learning models and
the two-period mover-stayer models. Testing the model with data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY-79), I find strong evidence supporting
the three-period asymmetric employer learning model.
The second chapter concerns economics of fertility and investigates to what
extent the observed correlation between adolescent fertility and poor maternal edu-
cational attainment is causal. Semi-parametric kernel matching estimator is applied
to estimate the effects of teenage childbearing on schooling outcomes. The matching
method estimates the conditional moments without imposing any functional form
restrictions and attends directly to the common support condition. Using data from
the NLSY-79, kernel matching estimates suggest that half of the cross-sectional ed-
ucational gaps remains after controlling for individual and family covariates. The
difference between matching estimates and regression-based estimates implies that
part of the conditional difference in parametric models is due to the functional as-
sumption. The robustness check following Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) reveals
that a substantial amount of correlation is required within a parametric framework
to make the negative effect of teen motherhood on educational attainment go away.
Further evidence obtained by simulation-based nonparametric sensitivity analysis
suggests that the matching estimates are quite robust with regard to a wide range
of specifications of the simulated unobservables.
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The development of the economics of human capital and the application of
traditional price theoretic models to non-market decision making in the last fifty
years has provided us a framework for the understanding of many aspects of observed
behavior in the labor market regarding schooling, occupation choice, job mobility,
etc.. Human capital, by definition, encompasses all the individual characteristics
that make people productive. This dissertation investigates how market uncertainty
about these productive skills affects wage determination and mobility patterns and
how fertility timing impacts the acquisition of human capital.
Understanding the information structure of how employers learn about work-
ers’ productivity is of crucial importance in our understanding of within-firm job
assignment, the wage structure and market discrimination. The simplifications of
the employer learning process in the previous literature either equate the infor-
mation sets of incumbent and outside firms or completely rule out learning by the
recruiting employers. The model constructed in the first chapter of this thesis treats
workers’ endogenous job mobility a signal used by the outside market participants
to assess the workers’ productive ability. This more realistic learning hypothesis
generates predictions that are different than both exiting public learning models
and two-period mover-stayer models for the relationship between mobility and abil-
ity, between job mobility history and the effect of ability on the wage, and between
the effect of schooling on wages and the extent of job mobility. I test all of these
implications using micro data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
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(NLSY-79). The empirical evidence broadly supports my three-period asymmet-
ric employer learning model with differential learning from incumbent and outside
employers.
Delayed motherhood is correlated with higher female socio-economic outcomes
in both cross-sectional and time-series comparisons, and human capital accumula-
tion is believed by many social scientists to be one of the important channels that
generates this association. The second chapter of the dissertation examines that
to what extent the observed correlation between teenage childbearing and poor
maternal educational attainment is causal. In this co-authored chapter with Seth
Sanders and Jeffrey Smith, we invoke a selection-on-observables identifying assump-
tion and use semi-parametric kernel matching estimator to explore this question in
a sample of NLSY-79. Our estimates suggest that adolescent fertility is detrimental
to the schooling outcomes of teen mothers, especially for high school completion.
The difference between matching estimates and regression-based estimates calls into
question the findings of parametric models: they may be biased due to the functional
form assumption. We also conduct sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of
our matching estimates against the failure of the identifying assumption. Following
Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005), a bivariate probit model reveals that a substantial
amount of correlation is required to wipe out the negative effect of teen mother-
hood on educational attainment. Following Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (2007),
the results obtained by the simulation-based nonparametric method suggests that
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Employer Learning under Asymmetric Information: Theory and
Evidence
1.1 Introduction
Asymmetric and imperfect information characterize almost every aspect of the
modern labor market, and economists have been interested in investigating their
consequences ever since the seminal work of Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1973).
This paper studies an employer’s private information about a worker’s productivity
and argues, theoretically and empirically, that early-career job mobility plays an
important role in the employer learning process about employees’ productive ability.
In a world where information about workers’ productivity is incomplete, it is
not possible for a company that is hiring to assess the value of a job candidate’s
unobserved innate ability. Instead, the potential worker’s employment history and
other forms of information about his productivity, such as resumes and reference
letters, usually serve as the basis for recruitment. This information imperfection
directly motivates the statistical theory of discrimination1 where firms distinguish
between individuals with different observable characteristics based on statistical reg-
ularities. Although some information about the worker’s ability is available to all
1See, among others, Aigner and Cain (1977), Lundberg and Startz (1983), Lang (1986), Coate
and Loury (1993), and Oettinger (1996).
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the firms in the market, it is reasonable to imagine that the incumbent employer
accumulates further information about the worker’s productive ability after produc-
tion begins, and then the employer updates its beliefs accordingly. The employer’s
subsequent wage offers and layoff/firing choices are conditioned on the revised ex-
pectations of the worker’s productivity. When the current employer and potential
employers set their wage rates according to different information sets, the worker’s
job mobility is endogenously determined by the wage offers from the two sides, and
his employment history conveys information regarding his unobserved productivity.
The job change pattern of the worker, which is an inevitable consequence of the
information asymmetry, provides outside employers with an additional tool to go
somewhat beyond the “veil of ignorance” and learn about the worker’s productive
ability. As intuitively appealing as it sounds, previous research on this topic has ne-
glected the learning process of outside employers through the worker’s employment
history.
The main contribution of this chapter, and the key feature of my employer
learning model, is to treat endogenous job mobility2 as an additional source of
information about a worker’s productivity that is available to the outside employers.3
In the context of asymmetric information, job changing as an outcome of market
adverse selection can be used by potential employers to assess the quality of the
worker. By offering workers with different mobility histories different wage rates,
2The model endogenizes job mobility by adding non-pecuniary job characteristics to the worker’s
utility function. For a similar approach to modeling mobility, see Neal (1998), Acemoglu and
Pischke (1998), and Schonberg (2005).
3Gibbons and Katz (2001) allow outside firms to learn the reasons for prior job separations and
condition their wage offers on them, but in reality, discerning the cause of a prior job change is
much more challenging than obtaining the employment history of a job applicant.
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market selection intensifies over time. In contrast, under the hypothesis that learning
is symmetric between incumbent and outside employers,4 job separations have no
implications for the worker’s expected productivity and mobility plays no role in
employer learning. While earlier research on asymmetric information in the labor
market recognizes that one consequence of private learning is that workers who
switch firms are of lower quality than workers who stay with their employers, it
relies on two-period mover-stayer type models and ignores the informational content
of job changes. These job changes help outside employers to dynamically acquire
extra information about worker productivity.
Using the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY-
79), and taking advantage of its unique cognitive ability measure, the Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT ) score, which provides a summary of basic math and
literacy skills that is not observed by the employers, I test the intensified adverse
selection model by examining whether the relationship between a worker’s AFQT
score and job mobility weakens as workers age. If employer learning is symmetric,
the average quality of workers who change jobs will be equal to that of workers who
do not. Additionally, if adverse selection does not worsen with the accumulation
of labor market experience as implied by the two-period mover-stayer asymmetric
employer learning model, then the correlation between the ability measure and the
probability of changing jobs should stay constant over time. In contrast, a model in
which job mobility serves as an ability signal to outside employers not only implies
4The symmetric learning models of Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001)
do not consider worker mobility at all.
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that the more frequent are job turnovers the lower is the quality of the worker,
but it also predicts that unobserved ability plays less and less of a vital role in the
mobility decision with each year that the worker spends in the labor market. Thus,
this implication empirically differentiates the three models.
I modify the empirical model of Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and
Pierret (2001) by incorporating into the wage regressions they specify the frequency
of prior job separations.5 I show that there is a difference between frequent job
movers and occasional movers in terms of how ability affects the way that the in-
cumbent and outside firms set their wage rates conditional on labor market experi-
ence. This finding is at odds with the public employer learning model because, in
the symmetric learning model, the assumption that the incumbent and recruiting
firms have the same amount of information about the worker’s ability implies that
the AFQT score affects every firm’s wage offer in the same fashion given experi-
ence. This finding is also not consistent with the two-period mover-stayer model
of private learning. If outside employers do not exploit the job mobility history
as an additional source of information to distinguish low quality from high quality
job candidates, the difference in the impacts of ability on wage rates between the
incumbent and outside firms is identical for workers with different mobility levels
given the same experience level. However, if the outside firms’ wage offers depend
on the employment history as described by the three-period model constructed in
this chapter, the outside employers will have a more accurate assessment about
5Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) use the frequency of prior moves as a control for individual
heterogeneity when estimating the returns to job seniority. I use the coefficients on the interaction
terms between prior mobility, test score, job tenure, and years of schooling to test the three-period
asymmetric employer learning model.
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the productivity of workers with more job changes, so the employer learning more
closely resembles public learning for this group of individuals. According to my
three-period model, both current employers and outside employers learn, although
through different channels. The incumbent employer updates its expectations of the
worker’s productivity by observing the worker’s output and, over time, relies less and
less on easily observable characteristics. The outside firms learn over time about
productivity through observing the job mobility history of the worker, and these
outside employers also depend less and less on variables like years of schooling. The
substitution of employment history for schooling as a productivity signal implied
by my model allows me to test the model by examining the impact of education on
wages for individuals with different job turnover patterns.
The first chapter of the dissertation unfolds as follows. Section 1.2 provides
a review of the employer learning literature. Section 1.3 presents my employer
learning model where a worker’s employment history is used by outside firms to
revise their expectations about the worker’s productivity, and contrasts the empirical
implications of my model with those of the public learning and two-period mover-
stayer models. Section 1.4 describes the data and Section 1.5 presents empirical
evidence. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Previous Literature on Employer Learning
While it seems plausible that prospective employers may be less informed
about the productivity of the worker than the current employer, it is assumptions
5
about how outside firms learn that divide the literature on employer learning. The
phrases “symmetric employer learning” or “public learning” refer to the body of
research that assumes away asymmetric information and instead assumes that all
market participants, incumbent or outside, have the same amount of information
about the worker’s productivity at each point in time and that the labor market
operates competitively. Examples of early theoretical analyses under the hypothesis
of public employer learning are Freeman (1977) and Harris and Holmstrom (1982).
Another set of studies, including this paper, assume that there is some degree of in-
formation asymmetry and that the incumbent employer has more information than
other firms about the employee’s ability. Under this assumption, recruiting firms
have an informational disadvantage relative to current employers. How the outside
firms use the information contained in the worker’s employment history to minimize
this disadvantage motivates this paper. In the literature, efforts have been made
to examine how “asymmetric employer learning”, or “private learning”, might gen-
erate inefficient job assignments within the firm; these include the models laid out
by Waldman (1984), Milgrom and Oster (1987), and Bernhart (1995). Other theo-
ries, such as those of Greenwald (1986) and Lazear (1986), focus on the analogous
implications for wage dynamics and job separations.
Two influential papers made empirical breakthroughs in testing the employer
learning model: Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001). Working
under the hypothesis of pure symmetric employer learning, they deliver testable
empirical implications that are consistent with the observed patterns in the data
for experience gradients, education, and test scores in a wage regression that are
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hard to reconcile with a simple human capital model. Their models predict that, at
labor market entry, firms rely on easy-to-observe variables that are correlated with
productivity to determine wage rates. Thus, the coefficient on a variable correlated
with productivity which is not observable to employers but is observed by economic
analysts should increase with labor market experience. The same argument leads
to the decreasing time path of the coefficient on the easy-to-observe variable that
is correlated with ability if the hard-to-observe measure of ability is included in the
wage regression.6 Both papers use the NLSY-79 to test their theoretical predictions
and obtain broadly supportive results. Their methodology also has been applied
to datasets outside of the United States. For example, Bauer and Haisken-DeNew
(2001) find some support for the symmetric employer learning model in German
data for blue-collar workers, but not for white-collar workers; Galindo-Rueda (2002)
obtains similar findings using data from the UK for approximately the same time
period as that considered by Altonji and Pierret (2001). More recently, Lange (2005)
develops an econometric model to estimate the speed of employer learning,7 also
under the pure symmetric learning assumption. He finds that employers are able to
reduce their average expectation error about the productivity of a worker by 50%
over the first three years and he concludes that this is rather fast. It is noteworthy
that if the current employer and outside employers hold different perceptions about
a worker’s productivity, then his conclusions may change.
6Altonji and Pierret (2001) specify their learning model in logarithms while Farber and Gibbons
(1996) specify the model in levels and derive that wages should follow a martingale.
7In an earlier paper, Altonji and Pierret (1998) recognize that the speed of employer learning
plays a crucial role in statistical discrimination. They argue that the observed coefficient patterns
in their earnings equation are consistent with a fast speed of employer learning and that this limits
the contribution of signaling to the returns to education.
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Empirical research on labor market asymmetric information is sparse and far
from conclusive. Gibbons and Katz (2001) test the asymmetric learning hypothesis
by comparing the earnings losses of workers who are laid off versus those who are
displaced for exogenous reasons, like a plant closing. Under the assumption that
information concerning a worker’s ability is private to the current employer, outside
market participants infer that laid-off workers are of low quality and label them
as “lemons”, but no such inference is warranted for exogenous job leavers. Since
pre-displacement wages do not differ by cause of displacement for the two groups
of workers, their asymmetric learning model predicts a greater wage loss for layoffs
than for those displaced by plant closing. Their empirical examination using the CPS
Displaced Workers Supplements (DWS) clearly supports their model predictions.8
Rodriguez-Planas (2004) extends the adverse selection model of Gibbons and
Katz (2001) by allowing recalls of laid-off workers to their original employers and
offers a new test of the importance of asymmetric information in the labor mar-
ket. She argues that if employers have discretion over whom to recall, high-ability
workers are more likely to be recalled and may choose to remain unemployed rather
than to accept a low-wage job offered early in their unemployment spell. If so, un-
employment can serve as a signal of productivity. In this case, her model suggests
that unemployment duration may be positively related to post-displacement wages
even among workers who are not recalled. In contrast, because workers displaced
through plant closings cannot be recalled, a longer duration of unemployment should
8Hu and Taber (2005) recently challenged the results of Gibbons and Katz (2001) by showing
the difference in wage loss between exogenous job leavers and layoffs varies dramatically by race
and gender. They offer heterogeneous human capital and taste-based discrimination as possible
explanations for the observed patterns for African Americans and females.
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not have a positive signaling benefit for such workers. Her empirical results using the
1988-2000 DWS reveal that the earnings and unemployment duration experiences
of the two groups behave in the predicted way and are consistent with asymmetric
information in the labor market.
1.3 The Asymmetric Employer Learning Model
1.3.1 A Basic Two-Period Model
First, let us consider a simple two-period employer learning model set up in
the spirit of Greenwald (1986) and Schonberg (2005) to highlight the way in which
asymmetric information and adverse selection distort market transactions. I extend
the model to a three-period setting in Subsection 1.3.2. This model assumes the
productivity of individual i in firm j, χi,j, is given by χi,j = ηi + δi,j, where ηi
denotes the ith worker’s time-invariant innate ability and δi,j is the quality of the
worker-firm match. The population distributions of ηi and δi,j are independent
and are common knowledge to all market participants. I further assume that ηi ∼
N(µη, σ
2
η), ∀i and δi,j ∼ N(µδ, σ2δ ), ∀i, j. Jobs are treated as pure search goods
in this model9 and match productivity is known ex ante. In another words, there
is no further information on match quality generated in the model as the match
proceeds. Following the job matching literature, a new value of δi,j is drawn from its
distribution with each job change and the successive drawings are independent. This
guarantees that the worker’s prior employment history is not relevant in assessing
9For “pure-search-good” models of job changes, see, among others, Lucas and Prescott (1974),
Burdett (1978), Mortensen (1978), Jovanovic (1979b), and Wilde (1979).
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his δi,j in a newly formed match.
10
The risk-neutral workers are also heterogeneous with regard to a non-pecuniary
utility component, θji,t, associated with job j for time period t.
11 The inclusion of this
taste parameter is in line with most of the existing work on asymmetric employer
learning and is part of an easy way to endogenize mobility. As explained by Green-
wald (1986), the “random” quit behavior generated by this type of heterogeneity is
critical to the existence of equilibrium turnover. In particular, it facilitates trading
even in the presence of adverse selection so that the market does not break down
completely as in Akerlof (1970). In this model, the non-pecuniary utility measure
is assumed to be transitory and workers draw a new value of θji,t in each period for
each job. This taste shock may refer to preferences to specific colleagues and super-
visors, the working environment, health and other benefit programs, etc. I specify
the distribution of θji,t as N(0, σ
2
θ) for any i, j, t.
Wage rates are determined on the spot market and long-term contracts of
any sort are assumed away. At the beginning of the first period, wages are offered
simultaneously by all of the recruiting employers. Firms do not see χi,j although
they know δi,j upon inspection. In addition, after production takes place, the ith
worker’s output for period 1 in firm j, yi,j,1, becomes known to the incumbent firm.
10Another line of job search and matching models treats match-specific productivity as an ex-
perience good; see, e.g., Johnson (1978), Jovanovic (1979a), and Moscarini (2003), where match
quality is not known ex ante but is learned over time as the job is “experienced”. In order to
concentrate attention on employer learning and sequential adverse selection, and to avoid the com-
plications caused by employee’s time varying perceptions of job quality, I model match quality as
an inspection good in this chapter.
11I use employer and job interchangeably in this paper. Empirically, the term “job” refers to any
position within a given employer rather than to a particular position with that employer. The work
history file in NLSY-79 does not provide enough information to distinguish job position changes
from employer changes.
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The public learning models of Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret
(2001) assume that the information held by employers is symmetric and all of the
firms in the market observe the same sequence of output (yi,j,1, yi,j,2, ..., yi,j,t) through
period t. In contrast, in my model, the productivity signal is only observed by the
worker’s current employer. This noisy measurement, yi,j,1 = χi,j + εi,j,1, is then used
by the current firm to update its expectation of the ith individual’s productivity.
With an additional assumption of an i.i.d normal distribution for εi,j,t, Bayes’s rule
yields the expected productivity at the end of period one from the perspective of
the incumbent employer:











The posterior mean is simply a weighted average of the prior expectation of the
worker’s productivity and the noise-ridden signal, where the weights depend on the
relative sizes of the prior variance and the variance of the noise term εi,j,1. The







, which is independent of
the realization of yi,j,1.
At the beginning of period two, potential employers first make wage offers.
The current employer then observes those wage offers and makes a counter offer.
This timing of events in wage determination is standard in the literature dealing with
asymmetric information.12 While the key empirical implications of the model remain
valid if the second-period wage offers are made simultaneously by the incumbent
12See, among others, Waldman (1984), Greenwald (1986), and Gibbons and Katz (1991).
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and outside firms, they are no longer attainable if the current employer makes the
first move. In this case, the incumbent firm loses its informational advantage and
reveals the productivity of its workers to the entire market by tying wage offers to
the productivity signals that only it observes. To avoid a host of game-theoretic
strategic considerations that lie beyond the scope of this paper, I maintain the
conventional assumption on the timing of wage offers. Observing the wage offers
and the new draws of the non-monetary utility component measures θji,2 , individual
i makes his mobility decision. Assuming risk-neutrality, the utility of job j consists
of the sum of the wage offer from employer j and the non-pecuniary taste measure,
wji,2 + θ
j
i,2, where j = c, o with c denoting the current employer and o the potential
alternative employer. Thus, worker i moves away from his current firm if and only
if wci,2 + θ
c
i,2 ≤ woi,2 + θoi,2. Making use of the distributional assumption about the




All workers are employed in both periods and retire at the end of the second period.
Working backwards from the second period and suppressing the individual
subscript i, with the updated expectation of the worker’s productivity as well as the

















while the outside employer maximizes
max
wo2










































The monotone hazard rate feature of normal random variables, d(1−Φ(θ)
φ(θ)
)/dθ < 0,
implies the quasi-concavity of the objective functions so that the first-order condi-
tions are sufficient for the maximization problems. The monotone hazard rate also
guarantees that the two reaction functions defined by the two first-order conditions
both have a positive slope less than one and that there is at most one intersection.
The equilibrium exists and is unique.13
The wage offer of the current employer depends on the productivity signal sent

















































13This equilibrium is different from the Nash equilibrium of Greenwald (1986) due to our differing
assumptions regarding the “random” quit behavior. His analysis relies on the assumption that the
probability of quitting equals one if the outside offer is greater than the wage offered by the
incumbent firm and equals a fixed value µ if the current employer offers a higher wage rate. As
a result of that, firms in his model simply retain high ability workers by matching their outside
offers.
13
In the context of match quality as an inspection good, the higher is the innate
ability, the higher is the wage offered by the incumbent firm. The relationship
between the current employer’s wage offer and the worker’s ability is not as strong
as the relationship between the incumbent’s wage offer and match quality. This
simply follows from the different learning mechanisms attached to the individual’s
innate ability and to the match-specific productivity. Job match quality is learned
instantly, without error ex ante, while ability has to be inferred from a series of






role in the updating process of expected productivity. It represents the noisiness
of the initial assessment of productivity relative to the noisiness of the subsequent
signals. It is clear from (1.6) that if subsequent signals are more noisy than the





, the lower the weight the incumbent
firm places on innate ability in wage setting.
At the same time, private information prevents potential employers from ob-
taining updated expectations of unobserved productivity, as a result, the outside
wage offer does not vary with η. Nevertheless, the relationship between the outside























which is intuitive given the assumption about the nature of job match quality. The

















That is, the probability of moving to another employer at the beginning of the second
period is higher for less able workers. Again, taking the derivative with respect to















Equation (1.10), along with (1.8), captures the notion of a “good match” in the
sense that it pays better and survives longer. Match quality has little impact on the
implications of asymmetric employer learning highlighted by (1.7) and (1.9). Topel
and Ward (1992),14 using longitudinal employee-employer data, indicate that wage
gains at job changes average about 10% and account for about one third of total
wage growth during the first ten years in the labor market. This evidence should not
be seen as contrary to the predictions of the asymmetric information model, as the
match-specific productivity δi,j in my model does allow between-job wage growth,
while their study does not deal with the quality of the workers across mobility levels.
To complete the model, I assume that the wage setting game on the entry-level
labor market resembles the standard inspection good job matching models and the
public learning models. Before period one, none of the firms in the labor market
14See Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006) for similar results from the NLSY-79.
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knows more about the productivity of the worker than the initial expectation, the
wage offers therefore do not depend on ability. Without loss of generality, I assume
only two potential employers j = J, K are competing for workers on the entry-level
market. This particular case can be extended readily to the N -firm case. If the
firms and workers share the same discount factor β, the ith individual’s expected


















where switching J and K yields the utility from working for firm K.
Taking the difference between the utilities from employer J and employer K
























yJ,1 − wJ2 ))], (1.12)
where Eη,ε denotes the expectation with respect to random variables η and ε. Re-
placing subscript J with K defines the optimization problem facing firm K. The
symmetry implies that in the entry-level market equilibrium, both firms offer the
same wage conditional on match quality, just as in the case of public learning, and
better match quality commands a higher wage rate. Combining match-specific pro-
ductivity and adverse selection on unobserved innate ability together implies that,
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although a “mismatch” leads to a lower wage and an early separation, job matching
alone does not predict that movers are of lower quality than stayers, which is an
important prediction from the two-period model.
1.3.2 A Three-Period Extension with Empirical Implications
While the two-period mover-stayer model does capture how private informa-
tion held by the current employer affects the worker’s mobility decision and wage
determination, it is silent about the role of job mobility in sequential market trading,
and it treats potential recruiting firms as completely “passive”. The extension to
a three-period setting allows the employment history of the workers on the second-
hand labor market to serve as another signal to outside firms and provides an addi-
tional channel for recruiting employers to learn about the unobserved productivity
of the workers. The two-period model suggests that worker ability and job mobility
are negatively correlated because of adverse selection. It is reasonable to think that
outside employers take prior job mobility into account when they make subsequent
wage offers. The three-period extension also sharply contrasts with the match qual-
ity story of job mobility, in which the prior employment history is independent of
the quality of a new match. Here, prior employment history is the driving force
behind dynamic adverse selection.
From the perspective of potential employers, at the end of period two workers
can be distinguished by their mobility decisions in the previous period. Conditional
on each of the two possible values of the number of job changes, m = 0, 1, the bidding
17
procedure is completely comparable to the one at the end of the first period. The
only difference is that the recruiting firms now know that the distribution of η is
different for workers with different m because market selection takes place at the
end of period one. For workers with m = 1, that is, those who change jobs at the
end of period one, the expected productivity becomes




> 0 and that everything else in the conditioning set of the expec-
tation of η is independent of η, the end-of-period-one adverse selection shifts the
ability distribution of the m = 1 workers toward the left. Similarly, asymmetric
employer learning shifts the distribution of η for the stayers toward the right.
Meanwhile, the incumbent firms of workers with m = 0 continue learning in













For the current employer of workers with m = 1, expected productivity takes the
form of (1.1).
With repeated market transactions as in the three-period model, potential































where c′ and o′ denote the incumbent and outside employers at the end of period
two and the numerical superscript on w3 represents the value of m. We further


















































Comparing (1.15) and (1.16) with (1.3), it is easy to see that the outside wage
offers for m = 0 individuals exceed those for m = 1 workers because E(η | wc2 >
wo2,i + θ
o
i − θci ) > E(η | wc2,i ≤ wo2,i + θoi − θci ). Movers, those with m = 1, are
adversely selected and have a worse η distribution than workers with m = 0. The
labor market recognizes this in the third period by offering them lower wage rates.
This is in contrast with the basic two-period framework where the equilibrium wage
on the second-hand market does not depend on η, as suggested by (1.3). Previous
research on asymmetric employer learning stops with the two-period framework and
compares quality between movers and stayers in terms of some aptitude test scores
such as the AFQT score. However, that approach neglects the intensified adverse
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selection that is induced in a third period and beyond by the information contained
in the worker’s employment history, and does not generate empirical implications
about the time path of the effect of ability on the wage offers from the incumbent and
from the outside employers. The three-period extension argues that the correlation
between the outside market equilibrium wage and unobserved ability increases with





























) < 0. (1.19)
Although (1.19) is negative,15 meaning that workers with lower values of η are still






changes after the second period than after the first period.16 There is an enor-
mous amount of heterogeneity among movers and an important tool for potential
recruiting firms that want to learn about this heterogeneity is job mobility history.
A typical two-period analysis, such as Schonberg (2005), predicts that the ability
gradient of the job separation probability remains constant over time. In contrast,
in the three-period case, incumbent firms gradually lose their informational advan-
tage due to the accumulation of knowledge about η by outside employers with the
result that employer learning on the market place converges to the public learning
model over time. The intensified adverse selection implies a decreasing effect of
innate ability on the job change probability. It is also obvious from (1.19), but still
15This is because the current employer still holds more information about η than the outside








16See Greenwald (1986) for a similar argument.
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= 0 for any t. When the information is
imperfect but symmetric, the ability distribution is identical across mobility levels
and the worker’s job changing decision depends on the match quality δ and the
non-pecuniary job characteristics θ.17




































































This inequality explicitly spells out employer learning: for workers staying with
their initial employers for the entire three periods, wage rates depend more and
more on unobserved productivity. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, this
increase in the correlation between wages and ability is larger than that in the pure





has two parts. The first term comes from the current employer learning more over















appears as the numerator of (1.6). The second term
is a special feature of this model and follows directly from the market feedback of
the job mobility decision. It represents the additional premium put on unobserved
productive ability by the current employer because he knows that outside recruiting
17Jovanovic (1979a) (footnote 11, p. 982) writes “...in other words, the model does not imply
that “movers” should do worse than “stayers” even though empirically this appears to be true...”
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firms can partially learn about the ability of the workers via the employment history.
Existing asymmetric employer learning models have been unable to lay this out
clearly and convincingly because they do not take into account the signaling effect
of job mobility on outside wage offers.
For workers who change jobs after period one, the increase in the correlation
between market wage rates and innate ability η over time also holds. The wage
determination process in (1.3) implies that for m = 1 workers, wage offers for period
two are constant over η because only µη enters (1.3), but the story told by (1.15)
and (1.17) is that whether or not these workers decide to change jobs at the end of










> 0. The three-
period asymmetric employer learning model agrees with the public learning models
and the earlier two-period analyses of private employer learning in that wages are
increasingly correlated with unobserved productivity as labor market experience
accumulates. It departs from existing studies in terms of its implications for the
differential returns to ability for people with different job changing patterns, even




























any point in time, for workers with the same amount of labor market experience. All
the wage offers, no matter where they come from, depend on η in the same way, given
the independence of η and match quality δ. And, individuals with different patterns
of prior job separations have the same returns to unobserved productive ability. The
two-period mover-stayer model in Schonberg (2005) recognizes that innate ability
has a stronger impact on wage offers for incumbent firms than for outside employers,
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and that the difference is greater as the informational advantage of the incumbent
firm increases. Based on this implication, Schonberg (2005) predicts a positive
coefficient on the variable that interacts the AFQT score and job tenure in a wage
regression. While in general this intuition still holds for the three-period model,
the absence of learning from outside employers in the two-period model implies the
independence of job mobility frequency and the differential impacts of ability on
wages offers from current and potential employers. In the three-period model, when
recruiting firms on the outside market take job mobility history into consideration
at the end of period two, the informational advantage of the current firm in period
two is lower than that in period one and the reduction is higher for workers with
more frequent job changes. The more information the outside firms have, the smaller
is the difference between the impacts of ability on wages for the incumbent versus
outside firms. This implication is not consistent with the mover-stayer model in
which learning by recruiting employers is ruled out. Thus, the signaling effect of the
prior job moves implies a negative coefficient for the variable which interacts the
test score, job tenure, and frequency of job mobility.
One real world application of employer learning models is to study statistical
discrimination, where firms distinguish among workers on the basis of easily ob-
servable variables that may be correlated with productivity like years of eduction,
gender, and race. Altonji and Pierret (2001) describe the intuition of such analyses
succinctly:
“As employers learn about the productivity of workers, s [which is schooling]
will get less of the credit for an association with productivity that arises because s
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is correlated with z [a variable like AFQT score that is initially unobserved, but is
positively correlated with both s and output], provided that z is included in the wage
equation with a time dependent coefficient and can claim the credit.”
Note that because a worker’s education level is part of the firm’s initial informa-
tion set and is incorporated into the determination of first-period wages, subsequent
innovations in wages can not be forecast from years of schooling.18 The empirical
regularity of a declining time path of the returns to schooling arises solely out of
the relationship between education and unobserved innate ability. To include easily
observed time-invariant characteristics like schooling in the model, I can redefine
productivity as
χj = rs + η + δj, (1.21)
where s denotes the years of schooling. Keeping everything else in the model un-
changed, the time path of the returns to η is shown to be increasing as firms accumu-
late more information, regardless of whether it is symmetrically or asymmetrically
distributed between the incumbent and potential employers. This learning effect on
the impact of ability spills over to the schooling variable that firms use to statistically
discriminate among new employees. Thus, following the same logic as in Altonji and
Pierret (2001), given cov(η, s) > 0, the model predicts that the coefficient on s in
a wage regression declines with labor market experience when an ability measure
unobservable to employers is included.
Unlike years of schooling, which is a time-invariant ability signal known to
18Farber and Gibbons (1996) make this point and predict a zero coefficient on the interaction
term between education and experience when the residualized AFQT score is included in a wage
regression.
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all the employers upon market entry, the job mobility history serves as a time-
varying signal to the outside firms in the three-period model. The information
contained in a worker’s employment history is utilized by potential hiring firms to
evaluate the productivity of the workers. The fact that learning by the outside firms
increasingly makes the time-invariant signal s redundant is another special feature
of the three-period model. Traditional analyses ignore the informational content
of prior job moves and imply that the effect of education on wages is independent
of job mobility, conditional on experience and job tenure. The signaling effect of
employment history, however, predicts a negative coefficient associated with the
interaction between years of schooling and the frequency of job mobility in a wage
regression.
1.4 The Data: NLSY-79
The empirical work is based on White, Black, and Hispanic males from the
1979-2000 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY-79). A key
feature of the NLSY-79 is that in addition to detailed information on family back-
ground, scholastic achievement, and labor market outcomes, its work history file
provides an unusually complete picture of employment for a cohort of young work-
ers during a period when they have made transitions from school to work. This
includes records of virtually every job held. As a result, it is ideal for my study.
The original NLSY-79 sample consists of 12,686 men and women (age 14-22 in 1979)
who were interviewed annually between 1979 and 1994 and biennially from 1996 to
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the present. There are three subsamples in the NLSY-79: a cross-sectional sample
representative of young people; a supplemental sample designed to oversample His-
panic, Black, and economically disadvantaged White youth; and a sample designed
to represent the population of those enlisted in one of the four branches of the mili-
tary. I exclude the military subsample from my analysis because, following the 1984
interview, the military subsample were no longer eligible for interview and it is hard
to construct a long enough employment series for respondents from this subsample.
In order to abstract the analysis from family and fertility decisions and focus
on a subpopulation with strong labor force attachment, I use male sample only.
There are 5579 males in the original NLSY-79 sample after eliminating the military
respondents. I exclude employment and wage observations from before a person
leaves school and begins to accumulate labor market experience, and only count job
changes from that point. My definition of the school-to-work transition date follows
that of Altonji and Pierret (2001):19 the month and year of the respondent’s most
recent enrollment in school at the first interview when the respondent is not currently
enrolled. I lose 49 individuals from the original sample because their school exit
date is indeterminate according to this definition. I also exclude 1137 individuals
whose labor market entry occurs before January 1978. Detailed information on
employment activities is only reported from that date onwards in the work history
file, so I can not construct accurate measures of overall mobility, work experience,
and job tenure for workers who start their careers before January 1978. Additionally,
19Alternatively, Farber and Gibbons (1996) define a transition as occurring if the worker is
classified as non-working for at least one year, followed by at least two consecutive years classified
as working, where a worker is classified as working when she has worked at least 26 weeks, and
during these weeks at least 30 hours, since the last interview.
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I delete 47 individuals because their actual labor market experience or job seniority is
indeterminate and another 12 individuals whose wage information is unreasonable,
which brings the sample size down to 4334. Furthermore, 202 individuals in the
sample did not take the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery20 (ASVAB)
tests which are used by the NLSY-79 to construct the AFQT score.21 After dropping
them, the remaining sample consists of 4132 individuals with 48,617 person-year
observations.
Table 1.1 contains summary statistics for observations used in the analysis.
Actual labor market experience is the number of weeks in which the worker works
more than 30 hours divided by 52 after the transition from school to work. I do
not count part-time employment, self-employment, time spent working without pay,
time spent unemployed, and time spent out of the labor force.22 Job tenure is
calculated as the number of weeks divided by 52 spent in full-time employment with
the same employer. The wage measure is the hourly wage at the beginning of each
employment spell from the NLSY-79 work history file. Wages are deflated by the
Consumer Price Index with 2002 as the base year; values below $1 and above $300
are considered unreasonable and dropped.23
The job mobility count is obtained from the work history file of the NLSY-79,
20The AFQT score is the sum of the raw scores from the following four sections of the ASVAB:
arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and one half of the score from
numerical operations section.
21The ASVAB was administered to the NSLY-79 respondents in 1980, thus, different respondents
took it at different ages. To eliminate age effects, I standardize the AFQT score within each birth
cohort.
22For the individuals who work more than one job at a point in time, I only consider the job at
which the respondent works the most hours during the week.
23I tried other cutoff values, such as $0.5 and $200. My empirical results are not sensitive to the
changes in the values used to define unreasonable wage observations. See Bollinger and Chandra
(2005) for more on this issue.
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which reports the starting dates for the jobs held at the time of each interview, as
well as for up to five jobs24 that began and ended since the last interview. I link
all the jobs across survey years25 and construct a complete employment history for
each individual in the sample. The frequency of job mobility is calculated as the
individual’s mean number of prior job separations as of time t. Table 1.2 shows the
distribution of the number of job separations by each worker during the first 2, 5,
and 10 years of his career as well as the total number of jobs held.
The average number of job separations in the first ten years is 5.6 with a
standard deviation of 4.0. The mean number of jobs actually held26 is 6.2 with
a standard deviation of 4.0. Table 1.2 also illustrates that only 3% of individuals
experience no job changes in the first 10 years of their career, while around 10% of
workers remain with their initial employers during the first five years and 38% for
the first two years. At the other extreme, 11% of individuals separate from 10 or
more employers within the first ten years after the school to work transition; that
is, they average over one job separation per year for the 10-year period. Table 1.2
demonstrates that the typical individual in the sample is quite mobile early in his
career.
The data on job separations also suggest that job mobility slows over time.
While this can not be said to be attributable solely to the intensified adverse selec-
24The NLSY-79 collects information on all jobs held by a respondent since the last interview,
however, the percentage of respondents who report more than five jobs in each survey year is less
than 1%.
25As the same employer can receive different job codes across survey years, it is necessary to use
beginning and ending dates as well as a series of matching variables to determine the job code in
the previous survey for every employer in the current survey and to decide whether it is a new job.
26Topel and Ward (1992) find that the average worker holds 6.1 jobs by the time he or she has
eight years of potential labor market experience in their longitudinal employer-employee data.
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tion, it is at least consistent with the three-period model where outside employers
take the employment history into account. In contrast, neither the symmetric em-
ployer learning model nor the two-period mover-stayer model implies a decline in job
turnover conditional on innate ability. About 30% of the sample undergoes no job
changes during the second five years, and 46% undergoes at most one job separation
during that time period.
Throughout the paper, I use the total number of job separations rather than
the number of voluntary job separations. It is not clear how to distinguish between
involuntary and voluntary job separations in the NLSY-79. The NLSY-79 codes a
large number of reported reasons for each job separation, including “bad working
condition”, “own illness”, “found better job”, “spouse changed jobs”, etc. If I delete
all job separations corresponding to “layoff” and “discharged/fired”, then 70% of all
the job separations remain. However, those remaining job separations still include
ones caused by family reasons as well as ones caused by “found better job” and “pay
too low”. Moreover, the explanation for over 25% of all job exits is coded as either
“other” or missing, so I must either eliminate those jobs or arbitrarily assign them
to voluntary or involuntary categories.
1.5 Econometric Specification and Empirical Results
One of the empirical implications of an employer learning model in which in-
formation about a worker’s productivity is public is a correlation of zero between
the worker’s innate ability and his probability of changing jobs. Both the two-period
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mover-stayer model of asymmetric employer learning and my three-period extension
challenge this by showing that the average quality of the job-changing pool is lower
than that of the pool of stayers. What differentiates these two versions of the asym-
metric information model is the prediction regarding how the relationship between
ability and the job change probability changes over time. In the absence of learning
by outside employers, the mover-stayer story implies a constant correlation between
η and the probability of job change. On the other hand, information accumulation
by potential employers through the observed job mobility history implies that this
relationship becomes weaker and weaker over time.
I test this implication of the learning model by estimating a probit model
where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether the worker experiences a
job changes in a given period,
Pr(JobChangei,t = 1) =Φ(β0 + β1AFQTi + β2(Expi,t/10)
+ β3(AFQTi × Expi,t/10) + β′XXi,t), (1.22)
where i is an individual, t is a survey year, Expi,t is actual labor market experience
and Xi,t is a vector of other control variables. Throughout the empirical analysis, I
normalize all the interactions between schooling and the AFQT score with experi-
ence to represent the change in the regression slope between Exp = 0 and Exp = 10.
Also, all of the standard errors reported in this paper are based on White/Huber
standard errors that account for arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity and correla-
tion among the multiple observations for each individual. All of the estimates in this
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paper are weighted by the sampling weights provided by the NLSY-79. Coefficients
β1 and β3 should both be zero under the assumption of public learning. All of the
asymmetric learning models imply a negative β1, but only a model with a signaling
effect of the job mobility history implies a positive coefficient β3.
The results of the job changing regressions are presented in Table 1.3. Col-
umn (1) in the table is the mean derivative estimated from a probit model where
the standardized AFQT score is the only explanatory variable. A one standard de-
viation increase in the test score is accompanied by a 3.6 percentage point decrease
in the probability of changing jobs. This preliminary evidence clearly rejects the
symmetric employer learning hypothesis via a highly statistically significant probit
marginal effect associated with the AFQT score. To distinguish the two types of
asymmetric learning hypotheses, column (2) estimates the same probit with expe-
rience and the interaction between the AFQT score and experience as additional
independent variables. The mean marginal effect on the AFQT score remains statis-
tically significant, and there is a positive and statistically significant estimate for the
interaction term of the AFQT score and labor market experience. The decreasing
time path of the absolute value of the impact of the AFQT score on the probabil-
ity of changing jobs is a unique prediction from the three-period adverse selection
model. It captures the closing of the informational gap between current and outside
employers about the productivity of the workers. The estimated marginal effect of
0.026 strongly suggests that not only does the current employer learn, but potential
employers also accumulate new information about a worker’s innate ability, so that
over time ability matters less and less in job changes.
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Including additional covariates in the probit regression, column (3) controls for
race, industry and occupation, and year effects. These control variables weaken the
correlation between the AFQT score and job mobility, but by no means eliminate
it. The probit marginal effects associated with the AFQT score and the interaction
term are still statistically significant and qualitatively tell the same story as column
(2). Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004) find strong evidence in the NLSY-79
suggesting that schooling is an important determinate of measured achievement
such as the ASVAB scores;27 their estimated increase in the AFQT score per year
of education for the average person is 0.17 standard deviation. To deal with the
effect of schooling on the test score, I construct the educational level and school
enrollment status at the ASVAB test date for each individual in the sample28 and
include them in the probit regression of column (4). Putting schooling information
as of the test date into the model substantially reduces the magnitude of the probit
coefficients: the estimated marginal effects of the AFQT score and the interaction
term stand at -0.012 and 0.014, respectively. Nevertheless, both are statistically
significant at the 5% level, and the overall conclusion is the same as that drawn
from column (2) and column (3). To summarize, the probit estimates shown in
Table 1.3 are consistent with an asymmetric employer learning model in which both
27See Neal and Johnson (1996) and Cascio and Lewis (2006) for a similar result.
28The ASVAB was administered during July–October 1980. Respondents in the NLSY-79 were
interviewed during January–August 1980 and January–July 1981. The NLSY-79 also includes a
measure of schooling and enrollment status as of May 1 of each survey year. Since the academic
year commonly ends in June, individuals advance to a higher completed grade level in June. I use
the highest grade completed and enrollment status as reported in the 1980 survey as schooling and
enrollment values at the test date if the interview was conducted during July–August 1980, and I
use the variables reported in 1981 if the interview was conducted during January-April 1981. For
the remaining respondents, I use the variables for May 1, 1981.
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the incumbent and the outside employers gather information about the worker’s
unobserved productivity. The negative and statistically significant mean marginal
effect of the AFQT score on the job change probability rejects the public learning
hypothesis, and the gradually decreasing association between the test score and the
probability of job separation is at odds with the two-period mover-stayer model.
To further distinguish the two versions of asymmetric employer learning mod-
els, one without outside employers learning and the other with potential firms learn-
ing through the employment history of the job candidate, I make use of the empirical
framework advanced by Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001).
Under the assumption of pure public learning, Altonji and Pierret (2001) estimate
a version of the standard earnings equation with schooling and the AFQT score
interacted with labor market experience
ln wi,t =α0 + α1Schoolingi + α2AFQTi + f(Expi,t/10)+
α3(Schoolingi × Expi,t/10) + α4(AFQTi × Expi,t/10) + α′XXi,t + ξi,t,
(1.23)
where the log wage for the ith worker at time t depends on his schooling, his AFQT
score, labor market experience, and other observable characteristics Xi,t. Their
model shows that when the AFQT score is included in the regression as an ability
measure, the time path of the coefficient on schooling declines with experience while
the coefficient on the AFQT score increases with labor market experience. As
employers learn more about the productive ability of a worker, they rely less on the
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easily observable variables such as education in the wage setting process. Note that
my model in Section 3 explicitly demonstrates that their implications regarding
the signs of α3 and α4 also hold even when the information about the worker’s
productivity is asymmetric.
Table 1.4 shows the results generated when their wage regressions are run on
my sample. In addition to the explanatory variables shown in the table, all of the
regressions control for race, a cubic in experience, industry and occupation, year
effects, education interacted with year effects, and Black and Hispanic interacted
with year effects. The first two columns report OLS estimates of (1.23). Columns
three and four report two stage least squares (2SLS) estimates using potential ex-
perience as an instrument for actual labor market experience.29 Looking across the
columns, the two sets of coefficient estimates tell the same story and confirm the
empirical findings of Altonji and Pierret (2001) that the impact of the AFQT score
on wages increases with labor market experience and the coefficient on years of
schooling decreases with experience.
While these estimates support the view that employers acquire new informa-
tion about workers’ productivity over time, they do not allow us to distinguish
among public learning, asymmetric learning without the outside employer accu-
mulating new information, and the three-period model developed in the Section
3. When the recruiting employers gather new information about the ability of the
worker through his employment history, my model predicts a declining difference be-
29Altonji and Pierret (2001) argue that the implications of employer learning for the wage equa-
tion may change if the intensity of work experience conveys information to employers about worker
quality.
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tween the impacts of ability on wage offers from the incumbent and the outside firms
with increasing job mobility, and therefore a negative coefficient for the interaction
term involving the AFQT score, job tenure, and the frequency of job mobility. I
estimate the following wage regression,
ln wi,t =γ0 + γ1Schoolingi + γ2AFQTi + f1(Expi,t/10) + f2(Tenurei,t/10)+
γ3Freqi,t + γ4(Schoolingi × Expi,t/10) + γ5(AFQTi × Expi,t/10)+
γ6(AFQTi × Tenurei,t/10) + γ7(AFQTi × Freqi,t)+
γ8(AFQTi × Tenurei,t/10× Freqi,t) + γ′XXi,t + ui,t, (1.24)
where Tenurei,t denotes job tenure and Freqi,t denotes the ith worker’s frequency
of job mobility as of time t. The closing informational gap between the current
and outside firms through employment history implies that γ8 < 0. On the other
hand, if the outside employers ignore the information concerning the worker’s innate
ability contained in the job mobility history as described in the two-period model,
or if their learning process occurs through other channels, then we would expect to
find γ8 = 0.
The OLS estimates of (1.24) are displayed in Table 1.5. Other covariates that
I control for are a cubic in experience, a cubic in job tenure, race, industry and
occupation, year effects, education interacted with experience, education interacted
with year effects, and interactions between the race dummies and the year effects.
Column (1) provides the regression estimates before controlling the measure of job
mobility. This coincides with existing tests of the asymmetric employer learning
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model such as those in Schonberg (2005). If employer learning is private, the impact
of ability on the wage offer of the current employer exceeds that of the outside firms,
which predicts γ6 > 0 in (1.24), as opposed to the case of pure symmetric learning
which implies γ6 = 0. In line with Schonberg (2005), my estimate for the coefficient
associated with the interaction term between the AFQT score and job tenure shows
a positive sign that is consistent with the asymmetric information model but fails
to pass the significance test at conventional levels. Schonberg (2005) only finds a
marginally significant estimate for γ6 after controlling for interactions between the
AFQT score and higher order tenure terms for her university graduates sample.
Column (2) of Table 1.5 estimates a complete version of (24) and paints a very
different picture. Not only does the positive and significant coefficient estimate of
0.021 for the AFQT score and job tenure interaction favor asymmetric employer
learning, but the estimated coefficient of -0.013 associated with the interaction be-
tween the AFQT score, job tenure, and the frequency of job mobility also suggests
that outside employers indeed acquire knowledge about the worker’s ability through
his job change pattern, with the result that the informational discrepancy between
the incumbent and potential employers in turn diminishes with experience. Condi-
tional on job tenure, I still see a positive coefficient estimate of 0.049 for the variable
interacting experience and the AFQT score, which reinforces the conclusion that
learning on the labor market is not purely asymmetric. I also find a negative coef-
ficient estimate for the frequency of job mobility30 which suggests that early-career
mobility does little to help but can do a significant amount to hurt wages. Although
30See Light and McGarry (1998) for similar findings.
36
this may not be a defining implication from the model, it is consistent with the
intensified adverse selection story.
As a time-varying signal of the worker ability, the availability to the market of
job mobility history also has implications for the role played by the time-invariant
observables that the employers initially use to statistically discriminate among work-
ers. To study how the worker’s career path affects the employer learning through
easy-to-observe characteristics like schooling, I estimate a wage equation of the type
ln wi,t =λ0 + λ1Schoolingi + λ2AFQTi + f1(Expi,t/10) + f2(Tenurei,t/10)+
λ3Freqi,t + λ4(Schoolingi × Expi,t/10) + λ5(AFQTi × Expi,t/10)+
λ6(Schoolingi × Teni,t/10) + λ7(AFQTi × Tenurei,t/10)+
λ8(Schoolingi × Freqi,t) + λ9(AFQTi × Freqi,t) + λ′XXi,t + vi,t. (1.25)
Table 1.6 reports the OLS estimates of (1.25) where X contains the same
additional variables as in Table 1.5. Column (1) excludes the job mobility measure
and its interactions with schooling and the AFQT score. Although the general
pattern of the coefficients on the interactions between the AFQT score and schooling
with experience suggested by the learning model is still borne out by the data,
the highly imprecise estimates for λ6 and λ7 tell us nothing about the nature of
employer learning. In column (2) of Table 1.6, the estimates support the three-
period model in which potential employers learn from the job mobility patterns. In
particular, the negative and significant coefficient estimate for the interaction term
of schooling and the frequency of job mobility implies that education plays less of a
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signaling role as outside firms rely more on employment history to assess the value
of the worker’s productivity. Information revelation as an immediate consequence
of intensified adverse selection helps the recruiting firms to become better informed
about the quality of the workers in the job-changing pool. Also, the coefficient on
the interaction of education and job tenure is negative, though only significant at the
10 percent level. It provides suggestive evidence that potential employers depend
more, relative to the incumbent employer, on schooling to determine their wage
offers. Taken together, these empirical results strongly surpport the aforementioned
three-period model in which not only do incumbent employers learn, but outside
firms also actively extract information from workers’ employment histories.
1.6 Conclusion
How do firms learn about their workers’ productivity? Do they use easily ob-
served characteristics such as education and race to statistically discriminate among
their workers? Do current employers have more information about the worker’s pro-
ductivity than outside firms? If they do, what can outside firms do to minimize their
informational disadvantage? During the past decade, labor economists have devel-
oped employer learning models to better understand the answers to these questions.
Although consensus has been reached, both theoretically and empirically, on the
existence of employer learning in the market place, our understanding of whether
learning is asymmetric and how the information asymmetry is resolved remains
unsatisfactory. This chapter builds a learning model under the hypothesis that in-
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cumbent employers have superior information about the productivity of its workers.
A special feature of my model is that outside employers, by observing workers’ job
mobility histories, also have access to information about the workers’ ability. This
attribute differentiates the present model from existing models of asymmetric em-
ployer learning that are based on the two-period mover-stayer model. My model
also includes a match-specific productivity component that is known ex ante and I
show that because the distribution of match quality is independent of worker abil-
ity and the quality of previous matches is irrelevant to newly formed job matches,
the presence of match-specific productivity does not alter the nature of employer
learning about the innate ability of their workers.
It is important to underscore the limits of this study. The literature has long
recognized that human capital accumulation may undermine the predictions from
learning models. Although the empirical evidence of intensified adverse selection
established through our probit estimates is based on a robust feature of the model,
the estimates of the wage regressions, especially the coefficient associated with the
interaction between the AFQT score and job seniority, also fit a model in which
ability aids the acquisition of specific human capital.31 This complementarity be-
tween ability and specific capital implies that more able workers command higher
returns to job tenure, which implies a positive coefficient for the interaction term
between the AFQT score and job seniority. It is very difficult to distinguish the
present model from a specific human capital model. I can only partially address
this concern, following Schonberg (2005), by looking at differential returns to job
31See Altonji and Spletzer (1991) for such an example.
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tenure by education level. The estimate from column (2) of Table 1.6, even though
only marginally significant, implies lower returns for higher educated workers. If we
expect individuals with more years of schooling to benefit more from job seniority
as the human capital theories imply, my negative coefficient is at odds with such
a prediction. My model also rules out the possibility of an experience-good nature
of job match, because analysis of an asymmetric employer learning model that also
allows learning about the match quality is rather complex and beyond the scope of
the current study.
To conclude, the empirical evidence from the NLSY-79 broadly supports the
implications from the dynamic adverse selection model: ability is negatively corre-
lated with the probability of changing jobs but this association weakens as young
workers advance in their careers; accruing information through observing the em-
ployment history on the part of outside firms gradually eliminates the knowledge
gap between them and incumbent firms; this in turn reduces over time the differ-
ence of the impacts of ability on wage rates between them and the incumbent firm,




Teenage Childbearing and Maternal Schooling Outcomes:
Evidence from Matching
2.1 Introduction
For more than forty years, teenage pregnancy and childbearing in the United
States has been a continuing source of concern to social science researchers and
policymakers. Simple tabulations of any nationally representative data set reveal
that adolescent parenthood reduces the teenager’s educational attainment, lowers
the probability of her eventual marriage, increases her welfare recipiency rate and
decreases her subsequent labor market income (Trussel 1976 and 1988; Hofferth
and Moore, 1979; and Upchurch and McCarthey, 1990). Despite the widely quoted
decline of the teen pregnancy and birth rates since 1990, we still witness over 750,000
women aged 15-19 become pregnant each year, among which more than 265,000
pregnancies happen to women aged 15-17. Overall, 75 pregnancies occur every year
per 1000 women aged 15-19 and the rate is 45 for women between 15 and 17 years
old. This rate is even higher for minority groups; black women have the highest
teen pregnancy rate with 134 pregnancies per 1000 women aged 15-19 and the rate
for Hispanic teens is 131 per 1000 (Guttmacher Institute, 2006). Moreover, teen
pregnancy and birth rates are much higher in the United States than in many other
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developed countries-twice as high as in England and Wales or Canada, and eight
times as high as in the Netherlands or Japan (Guttmacher Institute, 2006). Not only
can we see millions of American families struggle individually with the emotional
and economic challenges that adolescent pregnancy and childbearing bring, it also
poses a significant financial burden to society at large, as the average teen mother
receives welfare assistance valued at over $1400 annually during her first 13 years
of parenthood (Maynard, 1996). The summary in Risking the Future, the 1987
report of National Research Council, is well known: “Women who become parents
as teenagers are at greater risk of social and economic disadvantage throughout their
lives than those who delay childbearing”. In his 1995 State of the Union address,
President Clinton echoed this perspective by declaring that teenage pregnancy was
“our most serious social problem”.
Human capital accumulation is thought to be an important channel through
which early parenthood impacts the socio-economic outcomes of teen mothers. This
chapter analyzes to what extent teenage fertility affects the educational attainment
of adolescents. While the strong correlation of educational attainment and moth-
erhood timing is obvious from a simple cross tabulation, empirical economists have
known the phrase “correlation does not establish causation” long enough to recog-
nize the difficult challenge of isolating the causal effects. Non-random selection of
women into the population of teen mothers expressly stands in the way of disen-
tangling the causal link between schooling outcomes and teen fertility from other
confounding factors. Specifically, those women who bear children as teenagers may
well be the same women whose schooling levels would have been lowest in any case.
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In other words, if there are observed or unobserved variables that are correlated with
fertility and the mother’s educational outcome, then a negative correlation between
teenage childbearing and schooling may arise even if teenage births have no causal
influence on the mother’s subsequent outcomes at all.
In order to identify and consistently estimate the mean impact of teenage child-
bearing on the subpopulation who bear children early in their life cycle, the ideal
controlled experiment should randomly assign young women pregnancy and birth
timings so as to equate the distributions of observed and unobserved confounding
factors between teen mothers and their non-parenting counterparts. In the absence
of such data, the distribution of counterfactual educational outcomes that the ado-
lescent mothers would have attained had they not given birth as teens may well be
quite different from the factual schooling distribution of non-teen mothers that we
observe in the data and with which we approximate the missing counterfactuals.1
Numerous econometric techniques have been advanced to deal with the selection
issue and uncover the causal relationship between teen fertility and various adoles-
cent socio-economic outcomes, with focuses on different parameters of interest and
a wide range of identification strategies used in the literature, the results are so far
quite mixed.
This chapter takes a nationally representative sample from the National Longi-
tudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY-79) and applies kernel matching estimators to
three comparison sub-samples to re-examine the relationship between early parent-
1The common mean parameters of interest in the treatment effects literature only requires
certain moment independence conditions, which are less restrictive than the conditions imposed
on the whole distribution.
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hood and maternal educational attainment. Instead of just using the entire sample
of women who delay their childbearing age until after their 18th birthdays as a com-
parison group, we take advantage of the complete fertility history of each woman
available in the NLSY-79 file and try to improve the comparability of treatment and
comparison by utilizing two other comparison groups, those women who experience
their first pregnancy between their 18th and 19th birthdays and have a live birth
and those who become pregnant for the first time between 19 and 20 years old and
have a live birth. By doing so we can avoid, to some extent, the bias arising from
the unobserved confounding factors entering the fertility timing decision and the
schooling choice as well, although as we discuss later in the chapter, the nature
of the economic parameters we estimate changes as these two comparison groups
provide counterfactuals defined by becoming pregnant and having a live birth at
specific ages.
As we worry about the possibility that some of the causal estimates obtained
from semi-parametric matching may not be robust to violations of our identifying
assumption, we conduct two sensitivity analyses. Within a parametric regression
framework, we follow Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) and use a bivariate probit
model to assess how strong selection on unobservables would have to be in order to
imply that the entire estimated effect should be attributed to selection bias. Another
robustness check builds on the work of Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (2007) and
Rosenbaum (1987). Here, the intuition is quite simple. Suppose that our selection-
on-observables identifying assumption is not satisfied given the set of covariates
we condition on but would be satisfied if we could observe an additional binary
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covariate. This nonparametric sensitivity analysis simulates this binary variable in
the data and uses it as an additional matching factor; a comparison of the estimates
obtained with and without matching on this simulated confounding factor tells us
to what extent the estimator is robust to this specific deviation from our identifying
assumption.
The remainder of the chapter unfolds as follows. Section 2.2 surveys the cur-
rent literature and Section 2.3 defines our causal parameter and fleshes out the
identification strategy as well as the matching estimator. The samples and the vari-
ables of NLSY79 we use along with some summary statistics are laid out in Section
2.4. For the purpose of comparison, Section 2.5 presents probit estimates of the ef-
fects of adolescent motherhood on maternal education from the same samples. The
empirical results from matching methods are reported and discussed in section 2.6.
Section 2.7 assesses the role played by unobserved confounding factors by utiliz-
ing both parametric bivariate probit model and a nonparametric simulation-based
sensitivity analyses. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 2.8.
2.2 The Literature: A Cautionary Tale of Various Parameters of
Interests and Identification Strategies
Social scientists have failed to establish convincing causal evidence of the link
between teenage childbearing and mothers’ educational outcomes. Two related fea-
tures of the literature stand out in this debate. In order to achieve identification of
teenage childbearing effects, different exogeneity assumptions have been invoked in
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previous work and as a result, especially in the presence of heterogeneous effects,
different treatment parameters have been estimated. One key confusion within the
literature over “the effect” of teen motherhood is that in fact there are many differ-
ent effects and that each different effect can be estimated for different groups of the
population depending on the identification strategy.
The early multivariate analyses address the problem using traditional regression-
based mothods and adjust the pre-existing differences between teen mothers and girls
in the comparison group by controlling for observed characteristics.2 Large negative
effects of early motherhood are typically suggested by this type of research. The
identification of this linear control function model3 relies on the assumptions that
conditional on all the observables available to economic analysts, fertility timing is
exogenous with respect to future schooling outcomes and that the exact functional
form of the outcome equation is correctly specified by the linear model. These early
papers generally confines themselves in the world of common treatment effects, or
at most, heterogeneous effects in terms of observables. Aside from the potential for
unobservables to compromise the exogeneity of the timing of fertility, any misspec-
ification of the linear functional form will fail to account for the selection on the
non-linear part of the covariates, which leads to omitted variable bias.
Another line of work takes advantage of the sibling method or “within-family”
estimator (Griliches, 1979). The missing counterfactual is constructed using the
outcomes of the teen mother’s sisters who give births at an older age in order to dif-
2Influential examples include Card and Wise (1978), Hofferth and Moore (1979), Moore and
Waite (1977), Mott and Marsiglio (1985), and Upchurch and McCarthy (1990).
3See Barnow, Cain, and Goldberger (1980) for details concerning this method.
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ference out common family heterogeneity. Geronimus and Korenman (1992, 1993)
examined three nationally representative samples, the National Longitudinal Sur-
vey Young Women’s Sample (NLSYW), the NLSY-79, and the Panel Study of In-
come Dynamics (PSID), compared the “with-family” estimates with the traditional
cross-sectional estimates and concluded that in two out of three samples, sister
comparisons suggest the bias due to family background heterogeneity is important,
therefore, much of the cross-sectional correlation of teenage childbearing and poor
outcomes is not causal. This identification strategy makes use of the families with
siblings and those families already have relatively larger family sizes. Family size
is not randomly assigned and may be endogenous to other characteristics that are
also correlated with teen motherhood. Moreover, the wealth of the parents and the
way they invested among children may change over time. All of these factors may
challenge the external validity of the causal interpretation drawn from the estimates
in this kind of study.
Looking for exogenous variation that shifts the endogenous variable to achieve
“clean” identification of the causal parameters lies in the center of the toolkit of
modern applied economists. The term “natural experiment” was coined because,
ideally and if correctly implemented, this method works like a controlled randomized
experiment. Research in this category identifies the causal effects through sources
of naturally occurring variations in teen fertility and uses these sources as instru-
mental variables in estimation.4 When responses to treatment vary, as pointed out
4Some studies explicitly model the joint determination of fertility timing and maternal outcomes
in a simultaneous discrete choice framework-examples include Lundberg and Plotnick (1989) and
Ribar (1992, 1994)-but nonparametric identification of such models still requires exclusion restric-
tions (instrumental variables).
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by Heckman (1997), different choices of instrumental variables identify very differ-
ent local causal parameters and direct comparison of estimates obtained through
different instruments often leads to meaningless conclusions. Bronars and Grogger
(1993) identified the effects of adolescent motherhood by comparing the outcomes
of teenage mothers who bore twins at their first birth with those of teen mothers
who had a single child. Giving birth to twins is viewed as an exogenous shock to
aid the identification and this “twin-first” methodology measures the local average
treatment effect of an extra child that results from having twins at the first birth,
without suffering from selection bias. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to note that this
effect is somewhat different from what we want to identify in this chapter, namely,
the effect on educational attainment of having at least one child as a teenager rel-
ative to having no children at all before age 18. These authors did argue that this
effect should be at least as large as their “twin-first” estimate.
In another innovative paper, Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders (2005) exploited an
alternative type of fertility shock: some women who become pregnant experience a
miscarriage and thus do not end up with a child. Using women who miscarry before
18 years old as a comparison group for the adolescent mothers and based on several
assumptions5 that validate their IV estimator, they found that “little of their disad-
vantages would be changed just by getting teen mothers to delay their childbearing
into adulthood”. Their findings suggested that teenagers who become pregnant, but
5Specifically, they assume that the distributions of latent pregnancy resolution types are or-
thogonal to the miscarriage dummy variable and that the direct effects of miscarriage and abortion
on maternal outcomes are identical. In another paper, Hotz, Mullin, and Sanders (1997) show that
nonparametric bounds can be constructed for the causal effects of teenage childbearing on mother’s
outcomes when these assumptions fail.
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whose first birth was delayed by a miscarriage, do not have systematically better
outcomes than their peers who carry their babies to term. By focusing on the group
of women who experience at least one pregnancy as teenagers, Hotz, McElroy, and
Sanders’ (2005) parameter of interest is quite different from the rest of the litera-
ture; the local average effect they identify is the causal effect of having at least one
child before age 18 for teen mothers compared to the counterfactual of experiencing
pregnancy but not having any child as teens, thus, the estimates they obtain are
not directly comparable to the estimates in the other papers in the literature. A
recent study by Ashcraft and Lang (2006) challenges the findings of Hotz, McEl-
roy, and Sanders (2005), arguing that miscarriage is only a valid instrument for the
absence of birth in the absence of abortion. When abortion is an option, teenagers
who miscarry are less likely to be girls who would otherwise abort their pregnancy
than are teenagers who either abort or carry the child to term and since teenagers
who have abortions on average come from more favored backgrounds than those
who do not, girls who miscarry are not a random sample of pregnant teenagers but
are, instead, drawn from more disadvantaged backgrounds. Thus, the IV estimator
underestimates the true costs of teenage childbearing.
One common feature of the previous literature entails the imposition of strong
parametric restrictions. The specific functional form and distributional assumptions
about the error terms permit data from all observations to be smoothed into one esti-
mator. The validity of this estimator becomes suspect when the smoothing function
operates over observations with very different characteristics, in other words, when
we compare the “un-comparables”. The recent development of nonparametric esti-
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mators, such as the kernel matching estimator we are apply, enables researchers to
estimate conditional moments without imposing any functional form assumptions.
The identification of the mean effect of adolescent parenthood critically hinges on the
consistent estimation of the conterfactual mean, i.e. the mean educational outcome
of teenage mothers had they delayed their childbearing age. This chapter estimates
this counterfactual nonparametrically using a matching estimator and compares it
with the factual mean of teenage mother’s schooling outcomes to identify the causal
parameter. Matching allows us to utilize a larger sample size relative to the “natural
experiment” type studies which need to focus on some narrowly defined subpopu-
lation in order to make use of the exogenous variation.6 Levine and Painter (2003)
were the first to exploit matching methods in this topic. Their nearest neighbor
matching estimates based on a sample from National Education Longitudinal Survey
(NELS) reinforce the early findings that a substantial portion of the cross-sectional
relation between teen childbearing and high school completion is due to pre-existing
disadvantages of the adolescent mothers, not the childbirth itself. According to the
Monte Carlo study of Frölich (2004), nearest neighbor propensity score matching
estimator performs significantly worse in finite samples relative to other versions of
matching estimators. In addition, the NELS data only contain individuals who are
still in school at eighth grade. As such, a more careful implementation of different
types of matching algorithms on a more general sample is in order.
6For example, in Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders (2005) there are only 68 out of 980 women in
their sample who ever experienced a miscarriage.
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2.3 Parameter of Interest and Matching Estimator
To define the causal effect of interest in this chapter, let Y1 denotes a schooling
outcome, for example, high school completion, when a young woman is considered
to be teen mom, i.e. gives birth before she is 18 years old. Y0 is the outcome if
she has not given birth by the age of 18. Let D be the indicator which equals 1 if
this woman is actually a teenage mother and 0 otherwise. The causal effect we are
interested in is the average impact of having a birth as teenager versus not being a
teen mom, where not being a teen mom includes being a mother later and not being
a mother at all,7 on the schooling outcomes for the subpopulation of adolescent
mothers.8 It is worth noting that our treatment parameter combines a number of
treatments that can be examined separately, such as becoming a teen mother at
age 14, becoming a teen mother at age 15 and so on. In terms of notation, the
parameter we are identifying and estimating is
∆ττ = E(Y1 − Y0 | X, D = 1), (2.1)
where X is an individual and family characteristic vector. In the program evaluation
literature, this parameter is termed “treatment on the treated”. It can not be
identified directly from the data because the counterfactual mean, E(Y0 | X, D = 1),
is missing. Some form of exogeneity of the decision regarding whether to be a teen
7Teenage childbearing in this chapter refers to giving birth before the 18th birthday. This early
fertility measure ensures that most teenage births as we define them happen before high school
completion.
8Other interesting mean causal parameters, though not useful in this context, can be found in
Heckman and Robb (1985), and Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999).
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mom or not has to be assumed to identify E(Y0 | X,D = 1). With the wealth of the
background covariates and cognitive ability measures available in the NLSY-79 in
hand, our key identification strategy is formalized as the Conditional Independence
Assumption (CIA), 9
(Y0, Y1) ⊥⊥ D | X. (2.2)
This assumption also underlies the traditional regression analysis, Barnow,
Cain and Goldberger (1971) described a regression-based version of this condition
as “selection-on-observables”. However, matching and regression methods differ
in that regression-based methods also require that assumption (2.2) holds linearly
conditioning on X. The selection-on-observables assumption enables us to construct
the hypothetical untreated state for teen mothers from those women who have not
given births by age 18 conditional on all the variables that affect both the potential
schooling outcomes and the probability of being a teen mother. All we have to
do is to match each adolescent mother with the counterfactual schooling outcome
constructed from comparison individuals who have similar observed characteristics
according to some weighting algorithm. The difference between the teen mother and
matched comparison outcome after integrating out the characteristic distribution
equals the causal effect of teen fertility. Because we are only interested in the
average effect of “treatment on the treated”, we can weaken assumption (2.2) to
Y0 ⊥⊥ D | X. (2.3)
9This assumption is also known as ignorable treatment assignment assumption or unconfound-
edness, see Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), and Imbens (2004).
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Furthermore, as suggested by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1997), the
full independence assumption can be relaxed to Mean Independence Assumption to
identify our parameter of interest,
E(Y0 | X, D = 1) = E(Y0 | X, D = 0). (2.4)
Through weighting comparison group data to equate the distributions of ob-
servables of the teen mothers and the comparison observations, matching methods
are able to recover the mean causal effect correcting for selection based on the ob-
served confounding variables. Another advantage of matching methods over running
regressions lie in its ability to attend to the support issue. Using regression-based
models, counterfactuals for teen mothers whose characteristics lie outside the com-
mon support region are derived solely from projections based on the specific func-
tional form. Matching methods, although they do not solve the support problem
directly, give us insights into the issue that regression-based mothods are unable to
provide. Matching estimators directly put restrictions on the joint distribution of
treatment and observed covariates to aid the identification assumption (2.2),
0 < Pr(D = 1 | X) < 1 for all X. (2.5)
That is, the positive support region for the observable distributions should be iden-
tical for teen mothers and their counterparts. Again, if the parameter of interest is
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“treatment on the treated”, this condition can be reduced to
Pr(D = 1 | X) < 1. (2.6)
In practice, running nonparametric regressions on high dimensional X is quite
difficult due to sizable finite sample bias. When the dimension of the covariates
increases, it poses a major challenge to the convergence rate of the estimator; in
nonparametric econometrics, this is termed the “curse of dimensionality”. For ex-
ample, the strategy of building cells and matching units with exactly the same value
of multi-dimensional X may fail if X takes on too many distinct values. To avoid
the need to match observations on the values of all variables exactly, we must rely
on inexact matching providing that we make our matches more exact as the sam-
ple size gets larger. Propensity score matching is one type of inexact matching
where the propensity score is a young woman’s conditional probability of becoming
a teen mother. What makes the propensity score method feasible is a variation
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) of assumption (2.3)
Y0 ⊥⊥ D | Pr(D = 1 | X). (2.7)
Matching estimators based on the propensity score reduce the dimension of
conditioning set from all the covariates to a scalar, and adjustment for the propensity
score suffices to remove all biases originating from systematic differences of the
covariate distributions between treatment and comparison observations. Strictly
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speaking, propensity score matching still suffers from the “curse of dimensionality”
because it requires estimation of E(D | X). Practically, the propensity score is often
estimated parametrically, through logit or probit models and adjusted according to
some kind of specification or balancing tests. Under the identification assumptions






[Yi1 − Ê(Yi0 | P̂ (Xi), Di = 1)], (2.8)
where
Ê(Yi0 | P̂ (Xi), Di = 1) =
∑
j∈{D=0}
W (i, j)Yj0, (2.9)
where N1 denotes the number of teen mothers in the sample, P̂ (Xi) is the estimated
propensity score, i represents teen mothers and j denotes women in the comparison
group. The weights W (i, j) determine the subset of comparison members who are
matched with teen mom i and it also differentiates various matching estimators.10
Monte Carlo evidence provided by Frölich (2004) suggests that kernel type matching
estimators outperform nearest neighbor matching estimators and inverse propensity
score weighting estimators on a number of circumstances. Kernel matching esti-
mators assign non-zero weight to several, or even all, comparison observations to
construct counterfactual for each treatment individual. The weight is given by










10See Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) and Smith and Todd (2005a) for discussions of
various versions of matching estimators and their statistical properties.
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where K(·) is the kernel function and an is a bandwidth parameter. The kernel
function determines which part of the comparison population will participate in the
formation of the estimated counterfactual for person i. All the different matching
estimators are consistent assuming selection-on-observables holds.
2.4 The Data
Our analysis is based on female samples from the 1979 cohort of the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY-79). This is a national sample of Black, His-
panic, and White men and women who were 14 to 21 years old as of December
31, 1978. The initial surveys were conducted in 1979 and respondents have been
re-interviewed every year since then.11 We use the data through the year 2002
follow-up. The female respondents were asked a wide range of questions about
family background, home environment, fertility history, marital arrangements, edu-
cational attainment and welfare status. This richness of covariates makes the sample
ideal for our study and makes the assumption of selection-on-observables plausible.
Four independent probability samples comprise the original NLSY-79: a random
cross section of the population, a supplemental oversample of civilian Hispanics and
Blacks, a supplemental oversample of economically disadvantaged Whites, and a
sample drawn from members of the military. Most of the females from the military
sample were dropped out of the interviews after 1984 so we do not have the school-
ing outcome measures for them at older ages; thus, we drop them in our empirical
11The data of NLSY-79 were collected yearly from 1979 to 1994, and biennially from 1996 to
the present.
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analysis. Furthermore, all of the economically disadvantaged Whites have not been
interviewed since 1990 and we believe that the criteria used to select women into
this sample is not a very reliable way of identifying a representative sample of dis-
advantaged White women,12 we also exclude this sample. These exclusions leave us
with 4652 females in our analysis sample.
We construct complete fertility histories for all the individuals in the sample
and divide them into teen mothers and non-teen-mothers according to whether a
woman had a first birth before her 18th birthday. Table 2.1 reports the weighted
summary statistics13 for basic background characteristics of these women when they
were 14 years old.14 It is obvious from Table 2.1 that there are huge discrepancies in
almost all the dimensions of observable background characteristics and test scores
between teenage mothers and women who did not give birth before their 18th birth-
day. For example, teen mothers are more likely to be Black and Hispanic. The
pre-existing socio-economic disadvantages of women who experience early fertility
are clear. At age 14, the probability of living in an intact family is 0.15 lower for
the teen mother sample; they also tend to live in households with more siblings and
to have less-educated parents. Their families are less likely to have newspaper or
magazine subscriptions when they were 14. As a traditional measure of cognitive
skills or, ability, the last three rows of Table 2.1 present standard scores on three
of the ten-part Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) sections.15
12See Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders (2005) for more on this point.
13The weights account for the original design of the sample drawn in this study and differential
probabilities of completing the base year interview.
14The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test were administered in the
summer and fall of 1980.
15Another widely used measure of cognitive skills, the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)
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They are scores for “Arithmetic Reasoning”, “Word Knowledge”, and “Mathematics
Knowledge” and just like other covariates presented in the table, the more favorable
means all appear in the comparison sample. On average, women who did not give
birth before 18 score around 8 points, or one standard deviation higher than teenage
mothers in the ASVAB.
Table 2.2 shows the same summary statistics for the other two comparison
groups we construct. The Birth18 sample consists of all females in NLSY-79 who
experience their first pregnancy between their 18th and 19th birthdays and the
pregnancy ends with a live birth, the Birth19 sample contains those women who
become pregnant for the first time between 19 and 20 years old and the pregnancy
is resolved through live birth. These comparison females are more like the teen
mothers with regard to their fertility timing decisions. The gap in family background
measures and cognitive ability measures between the teen mothers and these two
samples is much smaller than the discrepancies in Table 2.1. For example, the
difference in the probability of living in an intact family at age 14 shrinks to 5-
8 percentage points from the 15 percentage point gap between the teen mother
sample and the whole comparison sample showed in Table 2.1. Intuitively, it seems
likely that using the comparison groups in Table 2.2 could lead to less selection
bias than using the whole sample, although there is evidence from the observable
family background variables and ability test scores that residual selection bias is still
concern in both samples. This consideration leads us to separately utilize the Birth18
score, is a weighted sum of four out of 10 scores of ASVAB sections related to literacy and basic
mathematic knowledge.
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and the Birth19 samples in addition to the whole sample in most of our empirical
analysis. We must be cautious about the nature of the treatment parameters we
identify when the composition of the comparison group women changes. Although
still economically interesting and policy relevent, using the Birth18 and the Birth19
comparison samples shifts the counterfactual state from not having a child before
the age of 18 to delaying childbearing until either age 18 or age 19.
2.5 Probit Estimates of the Effects of Teenage Childbearing
We first present probit estimates of the causal effects of teenage childbearing
on maternal high school completion and college attendance. The schooling outcome
variables we are interested in are high school completion by 21 years old and college
attendance by age 25. The high school completion variable reports whether the
person has finished at least 12 years of education by age 21. Previous research
like that in Cameron and Heckman (1993) and Tyler, Murnane, and Willett (2000)
suggested different labor market rewards associated with high school graduation
and General Educational Development (GED) recipiency. Thus, a GED completion
outcome variable by the age of 21 is also evaluated.
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show the coefficients on teenage motherhood binary vari-
able in univariate probit models for the three schooling outcomes estimated from
the three comparison samples: the whole sample and the Birth18 and the Birth19
samples. Numbers inside the brackets are average derivatives for the teen mother
sample. Focusing first on Table 2.3, where the full sample estimates are displayed,
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the raw educational attainment gaps, as shown by the average marginal effects of
the probit model without covariates, are 0.47 for high school completion and 0.38 for
college attendance. Teenage mothers have a higher GED completion rate by age 21
than their peers who haven’t given birth at 18, by 13 percentage points. These are
very large gaps considering that the high school completion and college attendance
rates of the full sample are 0.81 and 0.41, respectively. We progressively add covari-
ates into the regression as we move from column two to column four. Findings in the
second column indicates that inclusion of the family background controls reduces
the size of the estimated marginal effects. For example, the difference in the high
school completion by age 21 is reduced to 38 percentage points and the discrepancy
in the college attendance decreases to 22 percentage points. This is consistent with
the results documented in all of the cross-sectional studies of teen fertility effects.
A major advantage of the NLSY-79 data is the existence of controls for the
individual’s congitive abilities. These ability controls are based on the ASVAB and
O’Neill (1990), Blackburn and Neumark (1992), and Neal and Johnson (1996) have
used these ASVAB scores to control for otherwise unobserved differences in ability.
We adjust the 10 ASVAB scores for age and schooling by taking the residuals of
linear regressions of raw standard scores on individuals age, school enrollment status
at the test date and highest grade completed at the test date16 and use the first two
principal components of the adjusted ASVAB scores as additional control variables
as suggested by Heckman (1995) and Cawley, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2001). We
16For more detailed information about the adjustment procedure, see Hansen, Heckman, and
Mullen (2004).
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describe the adjustment procedure for ASVAB test scores in Table A1. Adding
these cognitive ability controls to the probit in the third column, we see that the
average marginal effects for high school completion and college attendence drop by 15
percentage points and 32 percentage points. At the same time, the pseudo R2s of the
probits for these two schooling outcomes increase from 0.265 and 0.206 to 0.392 and
0.317. The only exception is that the estimated teenage childbearing effect on GED
completion doesn’t change much after we condition on the ability measures. These
achievement test scores have strong predictive power for the schooling outcome in
addition to the part accounted for by the family background covariates. From the
first to the second column, the pseudo R2s for the regressions are doubled for the high
school related outcomes and increase by four times in the case of college attandence,
the background characteristics are powerful predictors of educational attainment and
lead to decreases in the estimated teenage childbearing effects. Nevertheless, these
effects are still substantial. Moreover, the positive GED impact is in agreement
with previous research.17 These estimates reinforce the idea that teen mothers try
to avoid receiving less education by substituting a GED for a high school diploma.
Table 2.4 presents the probit estimates of the effects of teenage childbearing
using the Birth18 and the Birth19 samples as comparison groups. The decline of the
estimated effects on high school outcomes is more impressive when we use women
whose first pregnancy is between their 18th and 19th birthdays and the pregnancy
ends with a live birth as comparisons. With the full set of controls, the difference
between the estimate in Table 2.3 and the upper panel of Table 2.4 is 14 percentage
17See Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders (2005).
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points, a 43% decrease. Changing the comparison women to the Birth19 sample,
the probit cofficient on the teen mother variable stays almost the same as the one
we get using the full sample. The estimated effects on the GED outcome variable
are still quite robust to the inclusion of background and ability covariates although
they decrease in magnitude when we change the comparison sample. In particular,
when the Birth19 comparison sample is used to estimate the counterfactual, the
estimated effect on GED outcome equals 6.9 percentage points, representing more
than a 40 percent reduction from the whole sample estimate. The substantively and
statistically significant estimated effects on high school completion in Table 2.3 and
Table 2.4 are suggestive that at least some portion of the observed cross-sectional
schooling gap is causally related to early childbearing.
The estimated effect of teen motherhood on college attendance is reduced from
0.15 to 0.011 and loses its statistical significance after we replace the full sample com-
parison with the Birth18 sample, and it becomes 0.046 and marginally significant
if we use the Birth19 sample. Unlike the high school graduation decision, which
coincides with the timing of giving birth for most teenage mothers, the decision to
go to college for most females in our sample comes much later, so that teenage child-
bearing is less likely to interfere with this outcome. Thus, it is not surprising to see
much smaller estimated effects once we switch to the more comparable comparison
groups.
Comparing Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, including additional covariates in the
probit regressions makes a much larger difference to the marginal effects in the
whole sample results in Table 2.3 than in the comparison samples in Table 2.4. For
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example, the effect on high school completion when the Birth18 comparison sample
is used is only reduced by 4 percentage points after we add all the controls, while in
the case of the full sample, this estimate is reduced by about 15 percentage points
after the same set of controls is added. The degree of selection based on observable
traits has been considerably reduced by only using women who have similar fertility
timing to the teenage mothers as comparison samples.
2.6 Matching Estimates of the Effects of Teenage Childbearing
Before proceeding to our matching estimates, it is useful to discuss the esti-
mation of the propensity score and examine the support condition in our samples.
The conditional probability of giving birth as a teen is a function of all the control
variables X that makes the condition (2.3) satisfied. The selection-on-observables
assumption conditioning on the propensity score is equivalent to assumption (2.3).
In fact, as pointed out by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1993),18 controlling for a balanc-
ing score, b(X),which is defined as a function of X that is finer than the propensity
score P (X) in the sense that b(X) = f(P (X)) for some function f , is sufficient
to guarantee the independence of potential outcomes and treatment status as long
as assumption (2.3) holds. Although an infinite number of balancing scores exist,
none of them is known in practice and a misspecified propensity score model may
lead to inconsistency of the matching estimator. Hence, figuring out a parametric
specification is an important practical concern.
A heuristic approach for testing the misspecification of the propensity score
18See Theorems 1,2, and 3 of Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983.
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model is adopted in this paper. A simple statistical property of the balancing score
justifies this test which is commonly referred to as balancing test in the program
evaluation literature,
X ⊥⊥ D | b(X). (2.11)
In another words, we examine whether the womens’ observable characteristics are in-
dependent of the teenage childbearing variable conditional on the estimated propen-
sity score to detect misspecification of the propensity score equation. A number of
empirical strategies have been applied in the literature to conduct the balancing test.
According to the Monte Carlo analysis by Smith and Zhang (2007), the regression-
based balancing test suggested in Smith and Todd (2005b) generally out-performs
other versions of the tests and so is used in this chapter. The regression model di-
rectly tests the balancing property by regressing each of the conditioning variables
in turn on a polynomial in the propensity score and the same polynomial interacted
with the treatment indicator. Specifically, this approach estimates the regression19
xk =β0 + β1P̂ (X) + β2P̂ (X)
2+
β3P̂ (X)
3 + α0D + α1DP̂ (X) + α2DP̂ (X)
2+
α3DP̂ (X)
3 + εk, (2.12)
and then performs an F test of the joint null that all of the coefficients on terms
involving D equal zero. This test directly gets at the condition that D provides no
19The requirement that the user must choose an order for the polynomial in the regression test
represents the primary unattractive feature of the test; we employ a cubic in this chapter.
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information about each xk conditional on the estimated propensity score. If any
of the these K F -statistics exceeds the conventional 5% critical value, we add to
the propensity score specification the higher order and interaction terms of those
imbalanced variables and run these regressions all over again.
In total, four higher order and interaction terms20 are added to the basic linear
probit specification in order to balance the observable controls in the full sample.
For the Birth18 and Birth19 comparison samples, two and five additional interaction
terms21 are needed to make the covariate distributions balance.
The estimated propensity score can help us to examine the common support
condition in the sample. Remember that the support assumption that matching
estimators require is (2.6) for the X, with matching performed on the balancing
score b(X), this condition can be rewritten as
Pr(D = 1 | b(X)) < 1 for all b(X). (2.13)
Thus, looking at the cumulative distribution functions of the estimated propensity
scores for the teenage moms and the comparison group can help us learn to what
extent condition (2.13) holds in our sample.
20These additional terms are the squared first principal component of the ASVAB test scores,
an interaction between father’s education and Black, an interaction of foreign language speaking
family dummy and the first principal component of the ASVAB test scores, and the interaction of
the frequent religious activity dummy and the first principal component of ASVAB test scores.
21For the Birth18 sample, these additional terms are the squared second principal component
of the ASVAB test scores and interaction between the number of siblings and the first principal
component of the ASVAB test scores. For the Birth19 sample, they are the squared first principal
component of the ASVAB test scores, the squared second principal component of the ASVAB
test scores, an interaction between Black and the second principal component of the ASVAB test
scores, the product of the frequent religious activity dummy and the second principal component
of the ASVAB test scores, and an interaction between intact family structure at age 14 and the
second principal component of ASVAB test scores.
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Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 illustrates the overlap of positive support of the
estimated propensity score distributions between women who give birth as teenagers
and women in the comparison samples. These are the histograms of the estimated
scores for both teen mothers and their peers who have not given birth by the age of
18. Figure 2.1 plots the histogram for the full sample and Figures 2.2 and 2.3 are for
the Birth18 and the Birth19 comparison samples. In all the three graphs, the darker
colored bars correspond to the D = 0 group. The X-axis defines the intervals of the
estimated score and the Y -axis is the frequency, for each group, with an estimated
propensity score in the corresponding interval. The message conveyed by these
graphs is that condition (2.13) is well satisfied in our sample.
For the whole sample, 15 percent of the comparison group sits below the first
percentile of the teen mothers; meanwhile, around 10 percent of the treatment group
lies above the 99th percentile of the comparison group. Indeed, the sample averages
of the estimated propensity score between the two groups are quite close, with
teen mother group being 0.23 and that for the comparison sample being 0.11. The
common support is even thicker when we use our alternative comparison samples.
With the Birth18 comparison sample, about 3 percent of the comparisons lie below
the first percentile of the treatment group and less than 4 percent of the young
mothers are above the 99th percentile of the comparison group. The corresponding
percentages for the Birth19 comparison group are 7 and less than 1.
Running nonparametric kernel regressions to estimate the missing counterfac-
tual requires us to select a kernel function K(·) and its associated bandwidth value
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an.
22 This task is carried out by leave-one-out cross validation following Racine and
Li (2003). Denote a combination of a certain kernel function K(·) and a bandwidth





[Yj − ˆY−j]2. (2.14)
Cross validation uses comparison observations to determine which of the competing
combination of kernel function and bandwidth value best fit the data. It takes one
comparison member out of the sample and uses the remaining N0 − 1 observations
to form an estimate of Yj. The out-of-sample prediction error is thus Yj − ˆY−j and
by repeating the process for every remaining observation in the comparison group,
the mean squared error serves as a reasonable guide for selecting the combination
of a kernel function and a bandwidth value. Table A2 reports the results of this
validation procedure for each outcome variable we evaluate and for each of the three
comparison samples we use. For eight of the nines cases, the Epanechnikov kernel
estimator outperforms the biweight and the Gaussian kernel estimators across a wide
range of bandwidth values. This is consistent with the cross-validation findings of





2 − 1)2 if | ψ |< 1;
0 otherwise.
(2) Gaussian kernel where K(ψ) is just a standard normal density function.





2) if | ψ |< 1;
0 otherwise.
The bandwidth search grid is 0.01, 0.02,...,1.
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Black and Smith (2004).23
Kernel matching estimates of the impact of teenage childbearing on schooling
outcomes appear in Table 2.5. These estimates are based on the leave-one-out
cross validated kernel functions and bandwidth values described in the previous
paragraph. Three panels from the top to the bottom present estimates using three
different comparison samples: the full sample, the Birth18 sample and the Birth19
sample. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis below the estimates; they come
from bootstrapping with 2000 replications.24 Accompanying each estimate, we also
indicate the number of teen mothers whose estimated propensity scores exceed the
range bounded by the minimum and maximum estimated scores of the comparison
members as additional examination of the common support problem. The low values
of these numbers (ranging from 1 to 6) provide further evidence that condition (2.13)
holds.
For the whole sample, matching estimates of the effect of a teen birth on high
school outcomes are negative 24.8 percentage points for high school graduation and
positive 7.3 percentage points for GED completion, both statistically significant at
conventional levels. These estimated effects are all smaller than the univariate probit
estimates from Table 2.3, a 22% reduction for the effect on high school completion
and a 38% decrease for the impact on GED completion by age 21. Substantively,
these point estimates provide strong reason for concern about teenage childbearing
effect estimates based on univariate probit regressions that control only linearly for
23Black and Smith (2004) also relied on this cross validation mechanism to guide their choices
of different versions of matching estimators. Their findings reinforced the results of Frölich (2004)
that nearest neighbors estimators usually perform worse than kernel estimators.
24The propensity score is re-estimated for each replication.
68
covariates. However, they support the view that there is still a significant negative
impact on schooling outcomes due to teenage motherhood even when all of the avail-
able individual and family factors have been taken into account semi-parametrically.
The estimates tell a similar story for college attendance by age 25. Our matching
estimate stands at -0.104 while the corresponding probit estimate is -0.148. The
smaller matching estimates provide evidence for the bias in traditional regression
models that control only linearly for covariates but still support the conclusion that
teenage fertility does lower maternal educational attainment. Put simply, there
are substantively and statistically significant schooling costs to women who become
mothers before they turn 18.
A similar pattern of differences between the univariate probit estimates and
the matching estimates emerges when we switch to the Birth18 and the Birth19
comparison samples. For all the schooling outcomes we evaluate, the kernel match-
ing estimates are always smaller in magnitude than the regression estimates and
accompanied by generally larger standard errors. For example, using the Birth18
comparison group, teen mothers have a higher probability of getting a GED, with
the difference being 7.1 percentage points according to the matching estimate, while
the probit gives an estimate of 10.6 percentage points. There are no statistically
significant differences in college attendance between teen mothers and their peers in
the comparison samples. Taking these findings together, after controlling for family
background and cognitive characteristics, a sizable negative impact of teen mother-
hood on high school completion still remains even when we define the counterfactual
as experiencing pregnancy between 18 and 19 years old and having live birth. The
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lesson regarding GED completion is the same in spirit as for the probit esitmates.
In contrast to the full sample estimates, the effect of teen fertility on college
attendance is substantially reduced when we change the comparison groups to the
Birth18 and the Birth19 samples. This is consistent with our findings from the probit
models. The −0.104 in the whole sample decreases to −0.025 for the Birth19 sample
and further to −0.007 when comparing to women in the Birth18 group. Eliminating
the potential selection bias arising from unobserved confounding factors affecting a
woman’s fertility timing realization makes a much larger difference for the effect of
college attendance. Although we still need to emphasize the change in the nature
of the parameter being estimated when different comparison samples are utilized,
early childbearing has a far smaller impact on the mother’s decision to go to college
than on high school completion.
2.7 Sensitivity Analysis: the Role of Unobservables
Our estimated effects of teenage childbearing on maternal educational attain-
ment put us at odds with most “natural experiment” type studies. For example,
exploiting miscarriage as an instrumental variable, Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders
(2005) suggested much smaller schooling effects of teenage childbearing. The only
statistically significant effect in their paper is the 0.13 point estimate of the GED
effect while their negative 11 percentage points high school diploma impact and 0.01
high school or GED impact do not attain statistical significance at the 5 percent
level. In spite of the difference between our “treatment on the treated” parameter
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and their local average treatment effect parameter, we remain concerned that our
empirical analysis does not control for all the possible covariates. And although
our results suggest only a small degree of selection on observables when we use the
Birth18 and the Birth19 comparison groups, it is still likely that a small amount of
selection on unobservables could bias our estimates. In order to assess the sensitivity
of the estimated teenage childbearing effects to the unobservables, we implement two
sensitivity analyses in this section. Note, however, that what we do in this section
does not test the identifying assumption of selection-on-observables; indeed, this
assumption is intrinsically not testable because the data are uninformative about
the distribution of untreated potential outcomes for the teen mother sample.
2.7.1 Bivariate Probit Model with Varying Correlation Coefficient
Following Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005), we first seek help from an explicit
econometric model of schooling decisions and adolescent childbearing. In particular,
consider a system of equations describing the joint determination of educational
attainment Y and teenage birth D:25
Y = 1(X ′β + Dγ + ε > 0) (2.15)
D = 1(X ′δ + η > 0)
25This kind of model is referred as a “multivariate probit model with structural shift” by Heck-
man (1978).
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where 1(·) is the indicator function, X still denotes the vector of family background
characteristics and ability measures and ε and η are the unobservables in the model.
We further assume, as is common in this kind of sample selection models, that
















Since the coefficients and error variances in such models are only identified up to
scale, we apply the standard normalization that σ2ε = σ
2
η = 1. Given this nor-
malization, the correlation coefficient between the unobserved factors, ρ, essentially
determines the degree of selection on unobservables when we estimate the causal
effect of teenage childbearing. The conditional independence assumption (2.2) im-
plies that the correlation equals zero. Although maximum likelihood estimation of
this bivariate probit model is easy to implement, nonparametric identification of
the effect of teen fertility, γ, requires an exclusion restriction.26 Hence, our first
sensitivity check hinges on a restricted version of this model, where ρ is treated as
an unidentified parameter.
The thought experiment estimates the bivariate probit model with various as-
sumed values of ρ, the correlation between the error components in the outcome
and participation equations. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present the estimated teen fertility
effects on schooling outcomes for various ρ values (0 to -0.5 for high school comple-
26Strictly speaking, this model can be identified parametrically from the functional form, but
applied economists are typically skeptical of the stability of the estimates from such models in the
absence of an exclusion restriction. Ribar (1994) estimated a similar model with three excluded
variables: age at menarche, availability of obstetricians/gynecologists, and the local abortion rate.
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tion and college attendance and 0 to 0.5 for the GED outcome). The full sample
estimates are reported in Table 2.6. Setting the correlation of the error terms to
zero reproduces the fourth column of Table 2.3, the average derivatives for the teen
mother sample from the univariate probit where teen childbearing is treated as ex-
ogenous conditional on all the covariates. The raw gap in the probability of high
school completion in the whole sample is 0.47, the estimated effect is -0.319 when
ρ = 0. Changing the correlation coefficient to -0.1, the effect declines to -0.294 and
further to -0.266 when we fix ρ at -0.3. Specifying teen childbearing as an endoge-
nous determinant of completing high school weakens the estimated effect of teenage
fertility. While at ρ = −0.5, the effect on high school completion shrinks to -8 per-
centage points but remains statistically significant. Its size is relatively small given
the sample mean high school completion rate for the 574 teen mothers is 0.437. To
wipe out the impact of teenage childbearing on high school completion and instead
attribute the estimated effect entirely to selection on unobservables, the correlation
between the unbserved factors in the outcome and participation equations has to
be greater in absolute value than 0.5.27 For the GED outcome, the marginal ef-
fect becomes both economically and statistically insignificant when we increase ρ
over 0.4. Both the univariate probit and matching estimates suggests smaller effects
on college attendance, especially in comparison to women whose fertility timing is
closer to that of the teen mothers. For example, in Table 2.7, only a little bit of
selection on the unobservable determinants of college attendance and teen fertility
27As noted in Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005), one problem with this type of sensitivity analy-
sis is the difficulty of judging reasonable magnitudes of the correlation coefficient without prior
knowledge.
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(ρ = −0.1) can account for the estimated effect.
Table 2.7 tells the story that the effect of high school completion is less sen-
sitive to the correlation coefficient. For example, even with ρ = −0.5, the estimate
obtained using the Birth19 sample is −0.114 and remains highly significant. It is
much larger compared to the full sample estimate when the correlation coefficient
is set at the same value although they are comparable in size when the univariate
probit model is analyzed. We see this as further support for the increased “com-
parability” when the Birth18 and the Birth19 females are taken as comparisons. It
does not take too many increases in the value of ρ (about 0.2 for GED and −0.1 for
college outcome) in the Birth19 sample to drive the already-small estimated impacts
of teenage childbearing on GED completion and college attendance to substantive
and statistical insignificance.
The variation in the estimated marginal effect of teen motherhood with the
varying values of ρ captures the possibility of selection on unobservables. Generally,
for the effect on the high school completion, we find that the correlation between
the unobservables in the equation system (2.15) has to be quite high (over 0.5 in
absolute value) to be able to explain away the whole impact. The less sensitive
impact estimates generated with the help of the Birth18 and the Birth19 samples
imply a smaller role for the unobservables, relative to the whole sample estimates.
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2.7.2 Simulation-based Nonparametric Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection, we follow Rosenbaum (1987) and Ichino, Mealli, and Nan-
nicini (2007) and assess the robustness of the estimated teenage childbearing effects
with respect to selection on unobservables through a simulation-based nonparamet-
ric analysis. The unobservables are assumed to be summarized by a binary variable
in order to simplify the analysis, although similar techniques could be used assuming
some other distribution for the unobservables. The central assumption of this analy-
sis is that teen motherhood is not exogenous conditional on the set of observables
X, thus,
P (D = 1 | Y0, Y1, X) 6= P (D = 1 | X). (2.16)
Instead, we assume that the conditional independence assumption holds conditional
on X and an unobserved binary covariate, U ,
P (D = 1 | Y0, Y1, X, U) = P (D = 1 | X, U). (2.17)
We impose the values of the parameters that characterize the distribution of
U . Given these parameters, we then predict a value of the confounding factor for
each teen mother and comparison group member and re-estimate the effects with the
simulated U in the set of conditioning variables. By changing the assumptions about
the distribution of U , we can assess the robustness of the matching estimates with
respect to different hypotheses regarding the nature of the unobservables. Formally,
consider our binary potential schooling outcome variable Y0, Y1 ∈ {0, 1}. Assuming
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that U is independent of X, we can characterize the distribution of U by specifying
the parameters
Pi,j = P (U = 1 | D = i, Y = j, X) = P (U = 1 | D = i, Y = j) (2.18)
with i, j ∈ {0, 1}, which gives the probability that U = 1 in each of the four groups
defined by teen mother status and schooling outcomes.
Given meaningful values of the parameters Pi,j, this sensitivity analysis pro-
ceeds by attributing a value of U to every female, according to her belonging to
one of the four groups defined by the values of i and j. We then treat U as an-
other observable used to estimate the propensity score and to compute the matching
estimates. In practice, we choose the values of the parameters Pi,j to make the distri-
bution of U similar to the empirical distribution of two observable binary covariates
in the sample: the Black binary variable and a dummy variable indicating whether
the individual’s first principal component of the ASVAB test scores lies above the
sample median. We choose these variables because of the significant gap in the frac-
tion of black between teen mothers and their comparisons and the strong predictive
power of the ASVAB test scores on schooling outcomes even conditional on other
observables. In this case, the simulation exercise is able to reveal the extent to which
our matching estimates are robust to deviations from the identifying assumption in-
duced by the impossibility of observing factors similar to the Black variable and the
ability measures. For example, the fraction of Blacks in the sample of teen mothers
who complete high school by age 21 is 0.65, as shown in Table 2.8, we therefore
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set the mean of the simulated U equal to 0.65 when we randomly assign values of
0 or 1 to the observations in this sample. After fixing the values of the sensitivity
parameters, we repeat the matching algorithm 1000 times and obtain an estimate
of the effect of teenage childbearing, which is an average of the impacts over the
distribution of the simulated U .28
During the implementation of this nonparametric sensitivity analysis, we also
measure how the different configurations of Pi,j chosen to simulate U translate into
associations of U with Y0 and D conditioning on X. More precisely, we estimate a
logit model of P (Y = 1 | D = 0, U, X) in every iteration and compute the effect of
U on the relative probability of having a positive schooling outcome in the case of







Similarly, by estimating the logit model of P (D = 1|U,X), the average odds ratio







28The standard error of the matching estimate when U is included as an additional covariate is













where k denotes the kth replication, m is the total number of replications, and ∆̂ττk and SE
2
k
represent the matching estimate and the estimated variance at the kth replication and ¯̂∆ττ is the
average of ∆̂ττk over m replications.
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Following Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (2007), we refer to Γ as the “outcome effect”
and Λ as the “selection effect”.
Results of the nonparametric sensitivity analysis are presented in Tables 2.8-
2.10 for the three comparison samples. To facilitate comparisons between actual
and simulated results, the first row of Tables 2.8-2.10 shows the baseline matching
estimates obtained with no unobservable from Table 2.5. The second row presents
the simulated estimates with a “neutral” unobservable with Pi,j = 0.5. By definition,
this simulated unobservable has zero outcome effect and zero selection effect but,
as we can see from the three tables, it is enough to slightly perturb the results. For
example, in Table 2.9, including such a neutral unobservable changes our matching
estimate from -0.127 to -0.123 for the high school completion outcome.
The next two rows of these tables show how the matching estimate changes
when the binary unobservable factor U is calibrated to mimic the Black variable and
the indicator variable for an above the median ability measure. Looking across these
tables, the simulated unobservable plays an important role either in the propensity
score estimation or in the outcome equation, but not both. For example, an unob-
servable imitating the empirical distribution of the ability measure binary variable
in the full sample has a negative effect on the relative probability of being a teen
mother with selection effect equal to 0.27 but has a much larger positive impact on
high school completion in the case of no treatment with an outcome effect of 10.1,
while the matching estimate differs by only three percentage points with respect
to the baseline estimate obtained in the absence of unobserved confounding effects.
The same pattern shows up in all three tables and none of the baseline matching esti-
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mates qualitatively change with the inclusion of the calibrated unobservables. Taken
in conjunction, these simulations convey the robustness of the baseline matching es-
timates of the teenage childbearing effects on maternal schooling outcomes. These
simulations also show that both the outcome and the selection effects of U must be
strong in order to represent a threat to the significance of the estimated impacts.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined the causal relationship between adolescent
fertility and maternal schooling outcomes through the method of matching in the
rich NLSY-79 data. Not only does the most basic regression-based econometric
approach rely heavily on assumptions about the parametric form of the regression
function, its ability to highlight the support issue, which may be important due
to the self-selected nature of teen childbearing, is also limited. As a result, regres-
sion estimates are often questioned. The matching estimator avoids the problematic
functional form assumption by estimating the counterfactual conditional mean non-
parametrically. It also provides us with a better tool to attend to the common
support condition through (2.13). The empirical results from kernel matching and
the related sensitivity checks support four main findings.
First, in agreement with earlier arguments in the literature, a substantial por-
tion of the correlation between low educational attainment and early motherhood is
not causal. There is substantial selection based on observed background character-
istics into the population of teenage mothers, but despite this selection the support
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condition holds fairly well in our sample. Restricting the comparison sample to
females who share similar fertility timing increases the “comparability” of the treat-
ment and comparison groups and, although it simultaneously changes the nature of
the parameters, delivers more convincing estimates.
Second, over half of the raw educational gap still remains after controlling
for an extensive set of covariates, indicating that being a teen mom implies hefty
schooling costs, especially in terms of high school completion. Many women who give
birth before 18 opt for GED as a substitute for formal high school level education.
Teen fertility makes only a small difference for college attendance by age 25.
Third, the considerable difference between the univariate probit estimates and
the kernel matching estimates we find in this chapter raises serious concerns over
the applicability of running regressions in this context. Nonetheless, although quite
different in magnitude, the negative schooling impacts of teenage childbearing do
not go away when semi-parametric matching is applied. Therefore, the matching
estimates still support the overall finding that teen motherhood itself contributes
causally to the poor educational outcomes of teen mothers.
Fourth, this chapter implements both parametric and nonparametric sensi-
tivity analyses to assess the role played by unobserved confounding factors. The
parametric version tells the story that a substantial amount of correlation is re-
quired to make the negative effect of teen motherhood on educational attainment
go away. A simulation-based nonparametric analysis sends the same general mes-
sage, as the baseline kernel matching estimates are quite robust with regard to a
wide range of different specifications of the simulated unobservables.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. 
Education 13.392 2.402 
Black 0.124 0.329 
Hispanic 0.061 0.239 
Ln(Real hourly wage) 2.556 0.592 
Actual experience 7.253 4.763 
Job tenure 2.913 3.356 
Standardized AFQT 0.000 1.000 
Source: Author's calculations from NLSY-79. 
Note: 1. The sample consists of 4132 individuals with 48617 observations in the years from 




      Table 1.2: Job Separations and Total Number of Jobs Held During the First 
2, 5, and 10 Years of Career 
 2 Years  5 Years  10 Years 
 Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Job separation: 0 0.384 0.486  0.103 0.304  0.032 0.177 
Job separation: 1  0.340 0.474  0.190 0.392  0.083 0.277 
Job separation: between 2 and 5 0.275 0.446  0.568 0.495  0.460 0.498 
Job separation: between 5 and 10 0.001 0.030  0.131 0.337  0.312 0.464 
Job separation: greater than 10 0 0  0.008 0.089  0.111 0.315 
Job separation: Max 6  19  29 
Job separation: total 1.024 1.068  3.016 2.323  5.568 3.950 
Jobs held: total 1.757 1.095  3.733 2.309  6.214 3.927 
Number of Observations 4132   4132   4132 
Source: Author's calculation from NLSY-79.  
Note: 1. All the estimates are weighted by the NLSY-79 sampling weights. 
2. Job separation counts and total number of jobs held are obtained from the NLSY-79 work 
history file which reports the starting and ending dates for jobs held at the time of each interview 




Table 1.3: Probit Marginal Effects of Standardized AFQT on Job Mobility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Standardized AFQT -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.025*** -0.012** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Standardized AFQT*Experience/10  0.026*** 0.015** 0.014** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Pseudo R2 0.004  0.167  0.187  0.189  
Number of Observations (Individuals) 48617 (4132) 
Source: Author's calculation from NLSY-79.  
Notes: 1. All the probit marginal effects are means of the individual marginal effects. 
2. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for at least one job separation during the year. 
Model (2) also includes experience/10 as independent variable. Model (3) also includes 
experience/10, black, hispanic, industry and occupation dummies, and year dummies as 
independent variables. Model (4) includes school enrollment status at the ASVAB test date and 
highest grade completed at the ASVAB test date as additional independent variables besides the 
ones in model (3). 
3. The standard errors are in parentheses and are White/Huber standard errors accounting for 
potential correlation at the individual level. The standard errors of the marginal effects are 
derived through the delta-method. * signifies significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and 




Table 1.4: The Effects of Schooling and Standardized AFQT on Wages 
 OLS  IV 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Education 0.066*** 0.070***  0.067*** 0.074*** 
 (0.016) (0.016)  (0.016) (0.016) 
Standardized AFQT 0.076*** 0.038***  0.072*** 0.018 
 (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.011) 
Education* Experience/10 -0.003 -0.034***  -0.050*** -0.065*** 
 (0.012) (0.013)  (0.018) (0.018) 
Standardized AFQT* Experience/10  0.052***   0.073*** 
  (0.011)   (0.011) 
R-squared 0.307 0.308  0.302 0.303 
Number of Observations (Individuals) 48617 (4132) 
Source: Author's calculation from NLSY-79. 
Note: 1. All the estimates are weighted by the sampling weights provided by the NLSY-79.  
2. The dependent variable is the natural log of the respondent's hourly wage. All the regressions 
in the table contain a cubic in experience, black, hispanic, industry and occupation affiliation, 
year effects, education interacted with year effects, interactions between black and year effects, 
and between hispanic and year effects.  
3. The standard errors are in parentheses and are White/Huber standard errors accounting for 
potential correlation at the individual level. * signifies significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% 




Table 1.5: The Relationship Among Wages, Standardized AFQT, Job Tenure, 
and  Frequency of Job Separations 
 (1) (2) 
Standardized AFQT 0.036*** 0.051*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) 
Standardized AFQT* Experience/10 0.048*** 0.049*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Standardized AFQT* Tenure/10 0.001 0.021** 
 (0.015) (0.011) 
Frequency of job separations  -0.002*** 
  (0.001) 
Standardized AFQT*Frequency of job separations  -0.001** 
  (0.000) 
Standardized AFQT*Tenure/10*Frequency of job separations  -0.013** 
  (0.005) 
R-squared 0.316 0.427 
Number of Observations (Individuals) 48617 (4132) 
Source: Author's calculation from NLSY-79.  
Note: 1. All the estimates are weighted by the sampling weights provided by the NLSY-79.  
2. The dependent variable is the natural log of the respondent's hourly wage. All regressions in 
the table contain a cubic in experience, a cubic in job tenure, black, hispanic, industry and 
occupation affiliation, year effects, education interacted with experience, education interacted 
with year effects, interactions between black and year effects, and between hispanic and year 
effects. 
3. The standard errors are in parentheses and are White/Huber standard errors accounting for 
potential correlation at the individual level. * signifies significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% 




Table 1.6: The Effects of Schooling and Standardized AFQT on Wages under 
Asymmetric Employer Learning 
 (1) (2) 
Education 0.069*** 0.094*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) 
Standardized AFQT 0.036*** 0.033** 
 (0.010) (0.013) 
Education* Experience/10 -0.035*** -0.034*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Standardized AFQT* Experience/10 0.056*** 0.056*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Education* Tenure/10 -0.009 -0.008* 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Standardized AFQT* Tenure/10 0.015 0.016** 
 (0.010) (0.008) 
Freqency of job separations  -0.016*** 
  (0.004) 
Education*Frequency of job separations   -0.001*** 
  (0.000) 
Standardized AFQT*Frequency of job separations  -0.002** 
  (0.001) 
R-squared 0.326 0.438 
Number of Observations (Individuals) 48617 (4132) 
Source: Author's calculation from NLSY-79. 
Note: 1. All the estimates are weighted by the sampling weights provided by the NLSY-79. 
2. The dependent variable is the natural log of the respondent's hourly wage. All regressions in 
the table contain a cubic in experience, a cubic in job tenure, black, hispanic, industry and 
occupation affiliation, year effects, education interacted with year effects, interactions between 
black and year effects, and between hispanic and year effects.  
3. The standard errors are in parentheses and are White/Huber standard errors accounting for 
potential correlation at the individual level. * signifies significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: Probit Estimates of Teenage Childbearing Effects on Maternal 
Schooling with NLSY-79 Female Sample 
        
Dependent variable No covariates Family background variables 
Col.2 plus 
ASVAB scores 
HS completion by age 21 -1.443 -1.207 -1.152 
(N=4643) (0.071) (0.078) (0.081) 
 [-0.467] [-0.376] [-0.319] 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) 
Pseudo R2 0.126 0.265 0.392 
GED by age 21 0.770 0.738 0.742 
(N=4628) (0.091) (0.103) (0.107) 
 [0.126] [0.116] [0.117] 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) 
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.087 0.093 
Attend college by age 25 -1.257 -0.972 -0.810 
(N=4629) (0.082) (0.096) (0.106) 
 [-0.382] [-0.218] [-0.148] 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.206 0.317 
Source: Authors' calculation from NLSY-79. 
Note: 1. Family background variables include Black, Hispanic, urban at 14, south at 14, intact 
family at 14, number of siblings, father's education, mother's education, foreign language 
speaking family, frequent religious activity, family had magazine subscription at 14, family had 
newspaper subscription at 14, family had library card at 14, and birth year dummies. ASVAB 
scores consist of the first two principal components of the ten age-adjusted test scores of ASVAB.  
2.  Sample is weighted by the revised NLSY-79 sampling weight that takes into account that we 
are omitting the poor white sub-sample. 
3. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the estimates and mean marginal effects for 
teen mother sample are in brackets. Standard errors of mean marginal effects are calculated by 




Table 2.4: Probit Estimates of Effects of Teenage Childbearing on Maternal 
Schooling with NLSY-79 Female Birth18 and Birth19 Samples 
        
Comparison: first pregnancy between 18th and 19th birthdays and end in live birth 
Dependent variable No covariates Family background variables 
Col.2 plus ASVAB 
scores 
HS completion by age 21 -0.584 -0.670 -0.675 
(N=852) (0.115) (0.124) (0.114) 
 [-0.228] [-0.219] [-0.183] 
 (0.043) (0.039) (0.036) 
Pseudo R2 0.035 0.172 0.319 
GED by age 21 0.589 0.715 0.835 
(N=851) (0.171) (0.177) (0.190) 
 [0.107] [0.100] [0.106] 
 (0.027) (0.020) (0.019) 
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.133 0.195 
Attend college by age 25 -0.091 -0.134 -0.072 
(N=849) (0.142) (0.149) (0.155) 
 [-0.016] [-0.023] [-0.011] 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) 
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.194 0.259 
Comparison: first pregnancy between 19th and 20th birthdays and end in live birth 
Dependent variable No covariates Family background variables 
Col.2 plus ASVAB 
scores 
HS completion by age 21 -1.014 -1.077 -1.194 
(N=850) (0.124) (0.136) (0.149) 
 [-0.369] [-0.331] [-0.310] 
 (0.039) (0.037) (0.035) 
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.234 0.369 
GED by age 21 0.268 0.372 0.451 
(N=849) (0.157) (0.166) (0.174) 
 [0.058] [0.061] [0.069] 
 (0.032) (0.025) (0.023) 
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.100 0.152 
Attend college by age 25 -0.376 -0.372 -0.284 
(N=851) (0.132) (0.150) (0.156) 
 [-0.079] [-0.070] [-0.046] 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.026) 
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Pseudo R2 0.017 0.197 0.288 
Source: Authors' calculation from NLSY-79. 
Note: 1. The Birth18 sample consists of NLSY-79 females whose first pregnancy was between their 18th 
and 19th birthdays and for whom the pregnancy ended with a live birth. The Birth19 sample consists of 
females who experienced their first pregnancy between their 19th to 20th birthdays and had the 
pregnancy result in a live birth. 
2. Family background variables include Black, Hispanic, urban at 14, south at 14, intact family at 14, 
number of siblings, father's education, mother's education, foreign language speaking family, frequent 
religious activity, family had magazine subscription at 14, family had newspaper subscription at 14, 
family had library card at 14, and birth year dummies. ASVAB scores consist of the first two principal 
components of the ten age-adjusted test scores of the ASVAB.  
3.  The Sample is weighted by the revised NLSY-79 sampling weight that takes into account that we are 
omitting the poor white sub-sample. 
4. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the estimates and mean marginal effects for the teen 





Table 2.5: Matching Estimates of Teenage Childbearing Effects on Maternal 
Schooling with NLSY-79 Female Samples 
      
Comparison: NLSY-79 Female Sample 
HS completion by age 21 GED by age 21 Attend college by age 25 
-0.248 0.073 -0.104 
(0.028) (0.019) (0.018) 
N1=573 N1=572 N1=572 
N0=4073 N0=4056 N0=4057 
Nnc=1 Nnc=1 Nnc=1 
Comparison: first pregnancy between 18th and 19th birthdays and end in live birth 
HS completion by age 21 GED by age 21 Attend college by age 25 
-0.127 0.071 -0.007 
(0.055) (0.024) (0.023)  
N1=573 N1=572 N1=572 
N0=279 N0=279 N0=277 
Nnc=6 Nnc=6 Nnc=6 
Comparison: first pregnancy between 19th and 20th birthdays and end in live birth 
HS completion by age 21 GED by age 21 Attend college by age 25 
-0.243 0.052 -0.025 
(0.041) (0.024) (0.026) 
N1=573 N1=572 N1=572 
N0=279 N0=279 N0=279 
Nnc=3 Nnc=3 Nnc=3 
Source: Authors' calculation from NLSY-79. 
Note: 1. The first panel uses the whole sample, the second panel uses women who experienced 
their first pregnancy after their 18th birthday and before their 19th birthday and for whom the 
pregnancy ended with a live birth as the comparison group while the third panel utilizes women 
who experienced their first pregnancy after their 19th birthday and before their 20th birthday and 
for whom the pregnancy ended in a live birth as the comparison group. 
2. These are kernel matching estimates based on probit-estimated propensity scores where the 
kernel types and bandwidth values are those in Table A2. They are obtained through leave-one-
out cross-validation. 
3.  Sample is weighted by the revised NLSY-79 sampling weight that takes into account that we are 
omitting the poor white sub-sample. 
4. Bootstrap standard errors from 2000 replications are in parentheses. N1 denotes the number of 
teen mothers and N0 is the number of comparison observations. Nnc is the number of treated 




Table 2.6: Sensitivity Analysis with Bivariate Probit Model                   
(NLSY-79 Female Sample) 
        
Correlation HS completion by age 21 GED by age 21 Attend college by age 25 
0.0 -0.319 0.117 -0.148 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.016) 
-0.1 -0.294 0.093 -0.123 
 (0.025) (0.017) (0.019) 
-0.2 -0.266 0.075 -0.108 
 (0.023) (0.015) (0.024) 
-0.3 -0.196 0.040 -0.097 
 (0.022) (0.013) (0.025) 
-0.4 -0.147 0.0008 -0.062 
 (0.019) (0.009) (0.026) 
-0.5 -0.080 -0.008 0.022  
  (0.017) (0.009) (0.027) 
Source: Authors' calculation from NLSY-79. 
Note: 1. Estimates are from bivariate probit models with the correlation coefficient of the bivariate normal 
distribution set to the values in the first column. The signs of the correlation coefficients are positive for the 
GED outcome in the third column. 
2.  Sample is weighted by the revised NLSY-79 sampling weight that takes into account that we are omitting 
the poor white sub-sample. 
3. These estimates are mean marginal effects for the teen mother sample. Robust standard errors which are 




Table 2.7: Sensitivity Analysis with Bivariate Probit Model                    
(NLSY-79 Female Birth18 and Birth19 Samples) 
        
Comparison: first pregnancy between 18th and 19th birthdays and end in live birth 
Correlation HS completion by age 21 GED by age 21 Attend college by age 25 
0.0 -0.183 0.106 -0.011 
 (0.036) (0.019) (0.023) 
-0.1 -0.163 0.096 -0.009 
 (0.035) (0.021) (0.023) 
-0.2 -0.153 0.071 0.007 
 (0.036) (0.021) (0.022) 
-0.3 -0.142 0.045 0.012 
 (0.037) (0.023) (0.024) 
-0.4 -0.120 0.015 0.028 
 (0.037) (0.023) (0.035) 
-0.5 -0.102 -0.003 0.040 
  (0.035) (0.026) (0.024) 
Comparison: first pregnancy between 19th and 20th birthdays and end in live birth 
Correlation HS completion by age 21 GED by age 21 Attend college by age 25 
0.0 -0.310 0.069 -0.046 
 (0.035) (0.023) (0.026) 
-0.1 -0.290 0.047 -0.037 
 (0.034) (0.024) (0.025) 
-0.2 -0.242 0.039 -0.025 
 (0.034) (0.025) (0.026) 
-0.3 -0.200 0.001 -0.020 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.024) 
-0.4 -0.170 -0.003 0.003 
 (0.035) (0.029) (0.025) 
-0.5 -0.114 -0.020 0.042 
  (0.035) (0.031) (0.025) 
Source: Authors' calculation from NLSY-79. 
Note: 1. The Birth18 sample consists of NLSY-79 females whose first pregnancy was between their 
18th and 19th birthdays and for whom the pregnancy ended with a live birth. The Birth19 sample 
consists of females who experienced their first pregnancy between their 19th to 20th birthdays and 
had the pregnancy result in a live birth. 
2. Estimates are from bivariate probit models with the correlation coefficient of the bivariate 
normal distribution set to the values in the first column. The signs of the correlation coefficients are 
positive for the GED outcome in the third column. 
2.  Sample is weighted by the revised NLSY-79 sampling weight that takes into account that we are 
omitting the poor white sub-sample. 
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3. These estimates are mean marginal effects for the teen mother sample. Robust standard errors 



































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1: Construction of First Two Principal Components of Adjusted 
ASVAB Test Scores 
          
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Explained 
Cumulative 
Explained 
1 6.640 5.806 0.664 0.664 
2 0.834 0.302 0.083 0.747 
3 0.532 0.079 0.053 0.801 
4 0.453 0.096 0.045 0.846 
5 0.356 0.028 0.036 0.882 
6 0.329 0.058 0.033 0.914 
7 0.271 0.018 0.027 0.941 
8 0.253 0.075 0.025 0.967 
9 0.177 0.022 0.018 0.985 
10 0.155 - 0.016 1.000 
Eigenvectors 1st PC 2nd PC 
General science 0.338 -0.180 
Arithmetic reasoning 0.336 -0.057 
Word knowledge 0.347 -0.026 
Paragraph comprehension 0.333 0.075 
Numerical operations 0.292 0.564 
Coding speed  0.273 0.622 
Auto and shop knowledge 0.293 -0.289 
Mathematics knowledge  0.327 -0.024 
Mechanical comprehension 0.303 -0.286 
Electrical information  0.311 -0.295 
Source: Authors' calculation from NLSY-79. 
Note: 1. ASVAB scores are adjusted for age by regressing each test score on birth year 
dummy variables and schooling information at the test date. Principal components analysis 




Table A2: Cross-Validation of Kernel Type and Bandwidth Value 
      
Comparison: NLSY-79 Female Sample 
Dependent variable  Cross-validated Kernel type Cross-validated bandwidth value 
HS completion by age 21 epanechnikov 0.05 
GED by age 21 gaussian 0.03 
Attend college by age 25 epanechnikov 0.02 
Comparison: first pregnancy between 18th and 19th birthdays and end in live birth 
Dependent variable  Cross-validated Kernel type Cross-validated bandwidth value 
HS completion by age 21 epanechnikov 0.03 
GED by age 21 epanechnikov 0.02 
Attend college by age 25 epanechnikov 0.02 
Comparison: first pregnancy between 19th and 20th birthdays and end in live birth 
Dependent variable  Cross-validated Kernel type Cross-validated bandwidth value 
HS completion by age 21 epanechnikov 0.03 
GED by age 21 epanechnikov 0.04 
Attend college by age 25 epanechnikov 0.02 
 
Note: 1. Cross-validation is done through leave-one-out mechanism. Within each comparison 
group, we choose the kernel type and bandwidth value as                      . 
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